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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a civil action for group insurance
benefits, tort damages and attorneys' fees resulting from a denial
of a health insurance claim.
Jurisdiction of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah
County, from which this appeal arises is based on UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-3-4(1) (1953, as amended).
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah
Supreme

Court

pursuant

to

Article

VIII,

Section

5

of

the

Constitution of the State of Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(1953, as amended) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

This case has been certified by the Utah Court of

Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 43 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Judgment of the Trial Court was entered on September 5, 1990
and Appellants' Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County, on September 18, 1990.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the

Trial

Court

properly

grant

Gem

Insurance

Company's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the Robertsons'
causes of action sounding in tort and breach of contract are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act? Gem has set
forth specifically the standard of appellate review for this issue
on page 11 of this Brief.

1

2.
of

Did the Trial Court properly limit the Robertsons1 award

attorneys1

prevailed?

fees

solely

to

those

Gem has

set

forth

issues

specifically

upon
the

which

they

standard

of

appellate review for this issue on pages 12-13 of this Brief.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001, et seq. ("ERISA") .

The relevant provisions of ERISA are

attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After injuring her neck shovelling snow on Christmas Day 1988,
and subsequently being treated by a doctor, appellant, Jackie
Robertson, submitted claims for that treatment to Gem Insurance
Company ("Gem") .

Gem, relying on statements made by her to her

physician and reflected in his records, denied coverage, alleging
that Jackie Robertson's injury was the result of a pre-existing
condition.

On or about July 20, 1989, the Robertsons initiated

suit for wrongful denial of insurance claims in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah. In their Complaint the
Robertsons alleged that Gem intentionally made false or misleading
representations

concerning policy benefits, knowing that such

representations

would

result

in the

infliction

of

emotional

distress; breached the terms of the insurance policy; and breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not promptly
and properly

investigating the Robertsons' claims and by not

providing payment under the policy. The Robertsons further claimed
2

that as a direct and proximate result of Gem's conduct, they
suffered a monetary loss in the amount of the policy benefits
wrongfully

denied,

disparagement,
expenses.

and

attorneys'

additional

damages

including

fees, and unspecified

credit

out-of-pocket

Finally, the Robertsons claimed that Gem exhibited a

willful disregard for their rights, peace of mind and emotional
well being, necessitating punitive damages.
On September 11, 1989, Gem filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
basis that ERISA governed the case at bar and therefore pre-empted
Utah State common law and statutory causes of action allowing for
claims such as breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive
damages. On November 6, 1989, after oral argument, the Lower Court
granted Gem's Motion to Dismiss, thereby holding over for trial the
issues of the Robertsons' claims for policy benefits and attorneys'
fees.

At trial the Lower Court found for the Robertsons and

against Gem, awarding judgment in the amount of $8,092.46 together
with interest at the legal rate of 10% per annum from May 1, 1989.
In addition, the Lower Court awarded reasonable attorneys' fees to
the Robertsons of $4,192.50.
On or about September 6, 1990, Gem delivered to the Robertsons
a check in the amount of $13,764.22 in full payment of the judgment
entered against Gem.

The Robertsons acknowledged satisfaction of

Gem's payment of the judgment, which Satisfaction of Judgment was
filed on or about September 11, 1990.
3

On September 18, 1990, the

Robertsons filed their Notice of Appeal with the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, appealing the Lower
Courtfs ruling for Gem on its Motion to Dismiss and the amount of
the Lower Court's award of attorneys1 fees to the Robertsons.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 26, 1988, Mountain States Steel ("Mountain
States") , Craig Robertson's employer, applied for membership in the
Intermountain Employers Trust

("IMET"), a multi-employer trust

which had contracted for group health insurance with Gem, for the
purpose of allowing it to acquire a group health insurance policy,
which low cost coverage it could then provide to its employees.
(See, Statement of Facts in Gem's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss, R. 35). Mountain States was accepted by IMET
on November 1, 1988. R. 36. A true and accurate copy of Mountain
States' Trust Subscription Agreement and Application is attached
hereto as Addendum B.
Craig Robertson and his dependent and wife Jackie Robertson
became beneficiaries under the Gem policy of insurance effective
November 1, 1988.

R. 36.

On or about December 25, 1988, Jackie Robertson injured her
neck.

Jackie Robertson submitted claims for medical care she

received

to Gem.

Plaintiffs' Complaint R.

Decision, R. 239.

4

1, 2; Memorandum

Gem denied Jackie Robertson's claims on the basis that such
injury was as a result of a pre-existing condition.

Plaintiffs'

Complaint R. 2, 3; Memorandum Decision, R. 239.
On or about July 20, 1989, the Robertsons brought suit against
Gem, alleging intentional misrepresentations of policy benefits,
intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress, breach

of the

insurance policy, and breach of the implied contractual covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The Robertsons claimed damages of
the

policy

benefits

disparagement,
expenses.

allegedly

attorneys'

The

fees,

Robertsons

wrongfully

denied,

and unspecified

also

sought

credit

out-of-pocket

punitive

damages.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 1-4.
On September 11, 1989, Gem filed a Motion to Dismiss all of
the Robertsons' claims except wrongful denial of insurance benefits
on the basis that ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. , governed the
Robertsons' claims and thereby preempted Utah common law and
statutory causes of action concerning their claims for breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages.
Written memoranda were filed by both parties.

R. 35.

At oral argument,

the Robertsons conceded that Mountain States' involvement with Gem
included a full contribution to the premium for its employees and
payroll deductions for employees' dependents' premiums. See, Brief
of Appellants, page 8, fn. 3.

Following oral argument, the Lower

Court held that the Robertsons' causes of action other than
5

wrongful denial of insurance benefits were pre-empted by ERISA and
dismissed all causes of action with the exception of that for
benefits under the policy and reasonable attorneys1 fees.

R. 84,

85.
A non-jury trial was held on June 25, 1990, regarding the
issues of policy benefits and attorneys1 fees.

On September 5,

199 0, the Lower Court entered judgment in favor of the Robertsons
in the amount of $8,092.46, together with interest at the legal
rate of 10% per annum from May 1, 1989. The Lower Court found that
policy benefits had been wrongfully denied to Jackie Robertson and
that

the

Robertsons

were

entitled

to

costs

and

reasonable

attorneys1 fees on the issue of benefits under the policy.

The

Lower Court affixed the reasonable attorneys1 fees at $4,192.50.
This figure represented the total time expended by the Robertsons1
counsel (92.5 hours), less 28 hours expended by the Robertsons1
counsel unsuccessfully opposing Gem's Motion to Dismiss, for a
total of 64.5 hours.

The Lower Court multiplied 64.5 hours times

the prevailing hourly rate in the Provo, Utah area of $65.00 per
hour to arrive at the figure of $4,192.50.

In reaching this

decision the Lower Court relied on the Utah Court of Appeals'
decision in Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P. 2d 643
(Utah App. 1989).
On

or

about

R. 252-258.
September

6,

1990,

Gem

delivered

to

the

Robertsons' counsel a check in the amount of $13,764.22, in full
payment of the judgment entered against Gem.
6

On September 11,

199 0, the Robertsons acknowledged satisfaction of Gem's payment of
the judgment in the amount of $13,764.22, which Satisfaction of
Judgment was filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court.
260, 261.

R.

See also, August 31 and September 4 & 6, 1990 letters

from Jeffrey R. Oritt to Jeffery Peatross, true and correct copies
of which are attached hereto as Addendum C.
On September 18, 1990, the Robertsons filed their Notice of
Appeal with the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State
of Utah.

Notice for Appeal, R. 262.

Previously, Gem terminated its agreement to provide insurance
to Mountain States due to the fact that Mountain States' employee
participation in the group health insurance had dropped below the
required level of 60% participation. The termination was effective
July 1, 1989.

See, letter dated July 17, 1989 from Carolyn Ivie

to Mountain States, a true and accurate copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum D.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Robertsons' appeal involves two distinct issues.

The

first issue is whether the Lower Court erred in granting Gem's
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Robertsons' state law
claims are pre-empted by ERISA, for which the standard of review
is to view facts alleged in the Robertsons1 Complaint in a light
most favorable to them and affirm the dismissal if it is apparent
that as a matter of law the Robertsons could not have recovered
under the facts alleged.

The second issue is the Lower Court's
7

failure to award them attorneys1 fees incurred for the issues on
which they did not prevail.

Since this decision was made after a

full hearing and the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Lower Court's decision as to attorneys1 fees should not
be overturned unless there is a showing of patent error or clear
abuse of discretion.
United States Supreme Court precident holds that ERISA preempts all state common law and statutory causes of action stemming
from a failure to pay benefits under ERISA-governed

employee

welfare benefit plans. The sole remedy available to beneficiaries
of an ERISA plan is to seek to enforce payment of medical benefits
and

for attorneys1

fees.

If Mountain States established an

employee welfare benefit plan as a matter of law, the Lower Court
was correct in dismissing all the Robertsons1 causes of action
except

for their

claim

for payment

of medical

expenses and

reasonable attorneys1 fees.
The employee welfare benefit plan ("Plan") as established by
the undisputed facts in this case was the obtaining by Mountain
States of group health insurance for its employees.

Mountain

States paid the premiums for single coverage for all of its
employees,

withheld

the

appropriate

sums

of

money

from

its

employeesf paychecks who opted to pay the extra premiums for more
extensive

family

coverage,

and

routed

those

monies

to

Gem.

Mountain States was also the liaison with Gem for its employees
with regard to any questions concerning documents or problems
8

concerning claims, and maintained all administrative instruction
sheets,

change

forms,

group

questionnaires sent by Gem.

enrollment

forms,

and

medical

When taken in the aggregate, these

undisputed acts show an intent on the part of Mountain States to
establish a Plan for its employees. Accordingly, because Mountain
States1 group health insurance policy is regulated by ERISA, all
of the Robertsons1 claims against Gem, other than the denial of
benefits claim, are pre-empted by ERISA and were properly dismissed
as a matter of law.
On or about September 6, 1990, Gem sent the Robertsons a check
in the amount of $13,764.22 in full satisfaction of the Judgment
entered against Gem on September 5, 199 0. The Robertsons, through
their attorney, executed a Notice of Judgment and Satisfaction of
Judgment on September 11, 1990, which was subsequently filed in the
Lower

Court, thus receiving

accepting payment thereon.

the benefit

of

the Judgment by

The Robertsons have accepted the

benefit of the attorneys1 fees paid and now seek to appeal the
detrimental part of that Judgment denying them attorneys» fees they
incurred in unsuccessfully opposing Gem's Motion to Dismiss.

The

Robertsons' actions constitute an acquiescence and acceptance of
the Judgment.

Therefore, the Robertsons have waived their right

to appeal the attorneys' fee award in this matter.
In addition, the Robertsons have accepted
disputed claim.

payment on a

The Robertsons apparently dispute the amount of

attorneys' fees awarded by the Lower Court and now attempt to
9

appeal the Lower Court's judgment.

If a party accepts payment of

a judgment, any portion of which is in dispute, that party waives
all errors concerning that judgment.

It is an

inconsistent

position for the Robertsons to accept payment of the attorneys'
fees awarded by the Lower Court, then appeal the Lower Court's
judgment as to attorneys' fees.
The Robertsons maintain that any award for attorneys' fees
should have granted under ERISA, not as a matter of state law.
ERISA provides that reasonable attorneys' fees and costs may be
awarded in any action under ERISA by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary, in the discretion of the court.

Courts have developed

a five factor test to utilize when deciding whether an award of
attorneys' fees is appropriate. Once the court has determined that
an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate, it must make findings
concerning the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to award
according to state law. Since the Lower Court did award attorneys'
fees to the Robertsons and did make appropriate findings as to the
reasonableness of those fees, the Lower Court's failure to rely on
ERISA

in

deciding

whether

an

award

of

attorneys'

fees

is

appropriate is harmless error and its decision should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review.

Because the Robertsons are appealing two different matters,
that is, (1) the Lower Court's granting of Gem's Motion to Dismiss
on the grounds that the Robertsons' state law claims are pre10

empted by ERISA; and (2) the Lower Court's award of attorneys1 fees
to the Robertsons after a full trial on the issue, two different
standards of review apply.
A.

Motion to Dismiss.
The standard of review employed by this Court when reviewing

the facts used by a Lower Court in granting or denying a Motion to
Dismiss1 is to view the facts alleged in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff.

Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 85 (Utah 1981);

Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Utah 1980).

In such an

appeal, the question before the Court is, "did plaintiff's evidence
when considered in the light most favorable to him show that he was
entitled to relief?"
338 (Utah 1960).

Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 348 P.2d 337,

The Lower Court's dismissal will be upheld if,

as a matter of law, plaintiff could not recover under the facts
alleged.

Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co. . Inc. . 779 P.2d 668, 669

(Utah 1989).

Gem submits, as set forth below, that even viewing

the facts in a light most favorable to the Robertsons, they were
beneficiaries under an ERISA plan and therefore all Utah state
common law and statutory causes of action were pre-empted by the
provisions of ERISA.

1

Throughout their brief, the Robertsons have confused Gem's
Motion to Dismiss in the Lower Court with a Motion for Summary
Judgment. However, the standard of review is the same.
11

B.

Discretionary award of attorneys1 fees.
The

Robertsons

attorneys'

also

appeal

fees to them.

the

Lower

Court's

Since the Lower

award

of

Court's award of

attorneys' fees was made after a full hearing on that issue and the
Lower Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning
attorneys' fees, its decision should not be overturned unless there
is a showing

of patent error or clear abuse of discretion.

Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d
Riemersma,

655

P.2d

1105,

692, 695

1110

(Utah

(Utah 1982); Sears v.
1982)

("The

award

of

attorney's fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court and
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse
of that discretion."); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy
Ass'n. , 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982) ("It is this Court's policy
to accord great deference to the discretionary conclusions of the
trial court regarding attorney fees.").
The standard of review under federal law is the same as the
standard under state law when applying the ERISA attorneys' fees
provision: the Lower Court's decision on the award of attorneys'
fees and costs can only be reversed if that decision constitutes
an abuse of discretion. Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d
115, 121 (7th Cir. 1989).
Gem submits that the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding the Robertsons attorneys' fees on those matters on
which they prevailed and denying the Robertsons attorneys' fees
expended in opposing Gem's Motion to Dismiss, on which issue they
12

did not prevail.

See, Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Nealef

776 P.2d 643, 649, n.10 (Utah App. 1989).
II.

A.

The Lower Court properly granted Gem's Motion
to Dismiss on the basis that the Robertsons1
causes of action for breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and punitive
damages are pre-empted by ERISA.

Introduction - Prevailing case law.
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct.

1549

(1987), the United States Supreme Court held that ERISA

preempts all state common law and statutory causes of action
stemming from a failure to pay benefits under ERISA-governed
employee welfare benefit plans (referred to hereafter as "Plan").
The civil enforcement provisions in ERISA which provide for the
resolution of disputes over the processing and payment of claims,
2 9 U.S.C. § 113 2, are the sole remedy for a beneficiary of an
ERISA-governed Plan who claims wrongful nonpayment of claims.
Pilot Life, 107 S.Ct. at 1556.

Indeed, the Robertsons have

admitted that as long as they were beneficiaries of a Plan, they
can bring no cause of action except a claim for payment of medical
expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing that
claim, under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.
In reaching its decision in Pilot Life, the Supreme Court
noted that Congress had included certain remedies in ERISA and
excluded others.

This exclusion of state common law tort and

contract claims was part of a Congressional policy to balance the
13

need for prompt and fair payment and settlement of claims with the
desire to encourage employers to form such Plans.

To allow

claimants to obtain remedies under state common law that Congress
had rejected would improperly undermine the policy choices made by
Congress.

Id. at 1556.

See also. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (ERISA provides no authority for an
award of punitive damages).
In exploring ERISA's broad pre-emption provisions in Pilot
Life, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that ERISA's preemption provisions were intentionally modeled after the very broad
pre-emption provisions of Section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

Pilot Life quotes the conference

report on ERISA:
Under the conference agreement, civil actions
may be brought by participant or beneficiary
to recover benefits due under the plan, to
clarify rights to receive future benefits under
the plan, and for relief
from breach of
fiduciary
responsibility . . ..
[W]ith
respect to suits to enforce benefits rights
under the plan or to recover benefits under
the plan which do not involve the application
of the title I provisions, they must be brought
not only in U.S. District Courts but also in
State courts of competent jurisdiction. All
such actions in Federal or State courts are to
be regarded as arising under the laws of United
States in similar fashion to those brought
under section 3 01 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 931280, p. 327 (1974), 107 S.Ct. at 1557.
(Emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court in Pilot Life then concludes:
14

Congress is well aware that the powerful preemptive force of § 3 01 of LMRA displaced all
state actions for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization,
even when the state action purported to
authorize a remedy unavailable under the
federal provision . . . .
Congress1 specific reference to Section 3 01 of
the LMRA to describe civil enforcement scheme
of ERISA makes clear its intention that all
suits brought by beneficiaries or participants
asserting improper processing of claims under
ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal
questions governed by Section 502(a).
Id.

(Emphasis added).
In Massachusetts Mutual Life v. Russell, 473 U.S. at 134, the

Supreme Court set forth in detail the proper analytical approach
to be followed in interpreting ERISA.

The Court notes that the

best guide to the meaning of the statute is the words used in the
statute itself. The broad scope of the pre-emption language of 29
U.S.C.

§

1144

has

repeatedly

been

recognized

by

courts

as

reflecting a deliberate intent by Congress that ERISA pre-emption
is to be broadly interpreted and applied.

The Russell Court

reviews the legislative history in some detail and notes that an
early version of ERISA contained a provision allowing for legal or
equitable relief which was described in both the Senate and House
Committee Reports as authorizing "the full range of legal and
equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts."
473 U.S. at 146, citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, page 17 (1973), U.S.
Code Cong, and Admin. News 1974 pp. 4639, 4655, 2 Leg. Hist. 2364;
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S. Rep. No, 93-127, p. 35 (1973), U.S. Code Cong, and Admin. News
1974, pp. 438, 471, 1 Leg. Hist. 621.
However, that language was deleted in the bill which passed
the House of Representatives and was ultimately adopted by the
Conference Committee.
legislative

history

473 U.S. at 146.
of

ERISA

shows,

and

In other words, the
the

Russell

court

recognized, that Congress made a deliberate policy choice to limit
the potential range of remedies available to plan participants and
beneficiaries than might otherwise be available under state law.
Since Pilot Life was handed down, federal circuit and district
courts have confirmed the Supreme Court's limitation of remedies
for ERISA-plan beneficiaries to ERISA's express civil enforcement
provisions.

In Belasco v. W. K. P. Wilson & Sonsf Inc., 833 F.2d

277 (11th Cir. 1987) , the court found that claims for bad faith and
fraud by the insurer were pre-empted by ERISA.

The Tenth Circuit

held that state common law claims of breach of contract are
preempted by ERISA.

Straub v. Western Union Tele. Co, , 851 F.2d

1262 (10th Cir. 1988).

The Ninth Circuit has held that claims of

breach of contract and duty of good faith and fair dealing are preempted by ERISA.
Cir. 1987).

Soroskv v. Burroughs Corp. , 826 F.2d 794 (9th

See also, Moore v. Provident Life and Accident Ins.

Co. , 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's claims for breach
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud are pre-empted by ERISA) ; Light v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. , 790 F.2d
16

1247

(5th Cir. 1986)

(plaintiff's

claims

for

bad

faith

refusal

to

pay

claims,

intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, negligent
infliction of severe emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duties
and deceit are pre-empted by ERISA); Howard v. Parisien, Inc., 807
F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (dismissing as pre-empted plaintiff's
claims for bad faith refusal to pay benefits and outrageous and
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
The Seventh Circuit has pre-empted state common law claims for
punitive damages and bad faith based upon ERISA's coverage. Reilly
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 846 F.2d 416
(7th Cir. 1988).

See also, Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medical and

Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988) (breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, estoppel, breach of contract and fraud claims
pre-empted by ERISA); Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F.Supp. 168 (D.N.J.
1987) (claims of breach of contract, emotional distress, punitive
damages and exemplary damages pre-empted by ERISA); Peckham, et al.
v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, No. Civ. 88-1513-T, slip opinion at
3-7, (W.D. Okla. August 2, 1989) (Thompson C.J.) (claims of breach
of duty of good faith and fair dealing, emotional distress, and
punitive damages pre-empted by ERISA —

excellent recitation of

national case law) (a true and correct copy of the Western District
of Oklahoma Courtfs opinion in Peckham is attached hereto as
Addendum E ) .
Therefore, if Mountain States established a Plan, the Lower
Court was correct in dismissing all of the Robertsons' causes of
17

action except their claim

for payment of medical expenses and

reasonable attorneys1 fees.
B.

Definition of a Plan.
A Plan is described under ERISA as:
[A]ny plan, fund or program which
was
heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or
is maintained for the purpose of providing for
its participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment or
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds or prepaid legal services,
or (B) any benefits described in Section 302C
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(other than pensions on retirement or death,
and insurance to provide such pensions).

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) .
The
followed

seminal

case

interpreting

29

U.S.C.

by the Pilot Life court as well

§

as the

1002(1),

and

overwhelming

majority of federal and state courts, is Donovan v. Dillingham, 688
F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982).

The Eleventh Circuit stated that a

Plan requires the following:
(1)

A plan, fund or program;

(2)

established or maintained;

(3)

by an employer or by an employee organization,
or by both;

(4)

for
the
purpose
of
providing
medical,
surgical, hospital care, sickness, accident,
disability or death benefits;
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(5)
Id. at 13 71.

to participants or their beneficiaries.
The court went on to say that a Plan under ERISA is

established if, from the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable
person could determine the intended benefits of the Plan, the
class

of

beneficiaries,

the

source

of

financing,

and

the

procedures for receiving benefits. The Plan did not have to be in
writing.

Furthermore, the purchase of a group health insurance

policy covering a class of employees offers substantial evidence
that a plan was established.

Id. at 1373.

Generally, the existence of a Plan is a question of fact to
be

resolved

in

light

of

all

the

surrounding

facts

circumstances from a point of view of a reasonable person.

and
Kanne

v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert, den'd., 109 S.Ct. 3216 (1989).
facts before

the Lower Court which

determined

However, the
that Mountain

States1 provision of group health insurance to its employees was
a Plan were undisputed.

The multi-employer trust created by Gem

and IMET is not the Plan.

The Plan, as established by the

undisputed facts in this case, was Mountain States' provision of
group

health

insurance

to

its

employees.

Such

provision

established a Plan governed by ERISA.
C.

Mountain States established an ERISA-governed Plan.
It was undisputed in the Lower Court that during the relevant

time period in this action, Mountain States provided group health
insurance coverage to its employees, including Plaintiff Craig
19

Robertson and his dependents.

Mountain States paid the premiums

for

of

single

coverage

for all

its employees, withheld

the

appropriate money from its employees' paychecks who opted to pay
the extra premiums for more extensive family coverage, and routed
those monies to Gem.

Mountain States was also the liaison with

Gem for its employees with regard to any questions concerning
documentation

or

problems

concerning

claims,

and

maintained

administrative files with regard to all administrative instruction
sheets,

change

questionnaires.

forms,

group

enrollment

forms

and

medical

Gem routed benefit description booklets through

Mountain States to its employees.

When taken in the aggregate,

these undisputed acts show an intent on the part of Mountain
States

to

employees.

establish

a

comprehensive

benefit

plan

for

its

See. December 5, 1988 Approval Letter from Gem to

Mountain States, a true and accurate copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum F.
While evidence of the establishment of a Plan may be found in
the language of the purported plan brochure or the insurance
policy
exists.

itself, this is not dispositive as to whether a Plan
Kanne, 867 F.2d at 493.

The Kanne court found that due

to the fact that the Plan brochure submitted

by Connecticut

General described the plan as an ERISA plan and because the
employer endorsed

that plan, there was not even a need for

employer contributions or automatic employee coverage to bring the
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plan within ERISA, as had been required by some post-Donovan
courts.

Id.

In fact, most courts hold that even though an insurance
policy, or corporate policy handbook, fails to mention that they
are

governed

by

ERISA,

or

fails

to

mention

the

requisite

disclosures required under ERISA, they are still governed by
ERISA, if it is determined to be a Plan.
Mutual

Life Insurance Co. , 688 F.Supp.

Dodd v. John Hancock
564

(E.D. Ca. 1988);

Comprehensive Care Corp. v. Douahtry, 682 F.Supp. 516 (S.D. Fl.
1988) ; Benvenuto v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. , 643
F.Supp. 87 (D. NJ 1988); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499
(9th Cir. 1985) .

These cases all hold that a Plan can be

regulated by ERISA even if the requisite disclosures have not been
made.

If a Plan could avoid being regulated by ERISA merely by

failing to comply with the rather onerous disclosure statements,
ERISA would be eviscerated as a regulatory device.
When an employer contracts with an insurance company (or in
this case, joins a multi-employer trust which contracts with an
insurance

company),

pays

company,

and

assumed

has

premiums

directly

control

and

to

the

insurance

responsibility

administering the policy, it has established a Plan.

for

Local Union

2134, UMW of America vs. Powhatan Fuel, Inc., 640 F.Supp. 731
(N.D. Ala. 1986).

At the other extreme is the case where an

employer offers no benefit plan to its employees but leaves each
employee free to purchase his or her own health insurance.
21

Here

ERISA would not govern.

Brundage-Peterson v. Comp. Health Care

Services Insurance, 877 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
Mountain

States

initiated

a

Plan

for

its

employees

by

applying for and obtaining a group health insurance policy, paying
the premiums

for

single

coverage

for each

of

its

employees

desiring coverage, administering the Plan by being a contact
between its employees and Gem, arranging for the collection of
premiums for excess coverage paid by its employees, and then
forwarding those premiums, plus the premiums it paid on behalf of
its employees, to Gem.
In Brundage-Peterson v. Comp. Care Health Services Ins. Corp.
877 F.2d at 509, a case similar to the one at bar, the plaintiff
appealed a detrimental ruling in the trial court that the Plan was
an ERISA plan and thus properly removed to the Federal District
Court.

The trial court, faced with the issue of whether a Plan

was established, found that the employer had made contracts with
two

insurance

companies

to

offer

health

insurance

to

its

employees; that all employees were eligible for coverage except
probationary
employees1

employees; and

that

the

employer

paid

for

the

(but not their dependents1) share of the insurance

premiums.
The Seventh Circuit, in finding the existence of a Plan,
found

that

the

Plan

in

Brundage-Peterson

components:
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contained

three

The contractual arrangements between the
employer and the insurance companies whereby
the latter agreed to insure the former's
employees; the eligibility requirement of being
an employee of more than 30 days' standing; and
the employer's contributions of the worker's
share of insurance premiums.
Id. at 510. The court also noted that the approach followed by the
Brundage-Petersons employer was "a common method by which employers
provide health and other welfare benefits to their employees, and
not one that has heretofore been thought to take a benefits plan
out of ERISA."

Id. at 511.

Finally the court noted that an

employer contracting with an insurance company (or a multi-employer
trust) to provide insurance coverage for its employees is not the
same as leaving each employee free to choose his or her insurance.
Id.
Such is the case here; Mountain States contracted with Gem
through IMET to provide insurance benefits to its employees.
determined

on what

date

its employees would

It

be eligible to

subscribe for insurance coverage and paid the premiums for its
employees coverage. Payment of its employees' premiums to Mountain
States strongly supports the existence of a Plan, as Mountain
States helped to defray its employees' insurance costs.

Id.

In Overcash v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina,
381 S.E.2d 330 (N.C. App. 1989), the court relied upon the fact
that the employer funded a group insurance plan to establish the
presence of an ERISA-covered plan, thus upholding the trial court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claims based on state law.
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In Rizzo

v. Travelers Insurance Co., 549 N.E.2d 810 (111. App. 1 Dist.
1989) , an employer purchased a group life insurance policy from
Travelers for the benefit of its employees.

The court found that

the purchase of the policy, along with the fact that the employee
could change his beneficiary by obtaining the required forms from
his employer and returning them to his employer, were sufficient
enough to establish a plan under ERISA.

In the case at bar, it is

undisputed that Mountain States purchased health insurance for its
employees and that applications and change forms for Mountain
States1 employees were routed from Gem to Mountain States and from
Mountain States1 employees through Mountain States to Gem.
Rizzo

concerns

life

insurance,

its

facts

relating

While

to

the

establishment of a plan are equally applicable to the procurement
of health insurance; both Rizzo and the case at bar concern group
insurance policies.
The Supreme Court has given some guidance on what constitutes
an ERISA plan.

In Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482

U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987), the court found that a Maine law
providing for a one-time severance payment to its employees in the
event of a plant closing was not pre-empted by ERISA, as it did not
establish a Plan. Court found that ERISA only pre-empts state laws
relating

to

employee benefits

and that this

statute

neither

established nor required an employer to maintain an ongoing Plan.
The

statute

did

not

require

the

employer

to

set

up

an

administrative scheme or to assume responsibilities for benefits
24

on a regular basis.

Therefore, the employer faced no periodic

demands on its assets, no need for financial control was created,
and the employer was not required to create an administrative
program to process claims or handle premium payments on a monthly
basis.

Id. at 2218.

While the Robertsons cite Fort Halifax Packing in support of
their argument, the Robertsons wrongly interpret it to require
employers to process claims as part

of their

administrative

responsibility in order to be determined to be providing a Plan.
This is an expansion of the Fort Halifax Packing ruling without any
basis in the opinion.

Mountain States did face a periodic demand

on its assets, as it paid the premiums for its employees' coverage
on a monthly basis.

This shows far more activity by an employer

than required by the state statute at issue in Fort Halifax
Packing.

Plaintiff Craig Robertson's employer's group health

insurance policy benefits are a "plan" rather than a one time
"benefit".

See, Rizzi v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 206

Cal.App.3d 380, 389 (1988).
The Robertsons also cite Taggart Corp. v. Life and Health
Benefits Administration, 617 F.2d 1208

(5th Cir. 1980), which

determined that on the facts of that case there was not a Plan
established
organization.

or

maintained

by

an

employer

or

an

employee

However, Taggart can be distinguished on the fact

that a corporation had purchased insurance for its sole employee.
The court held that ERISA does not regulate the "bare purchase of
25

health insurance where, as here, the purchasing employer neither
directly owns, controls, administers or assumes responsibility for
the policy or its benefits."

Id, at 1211.

In Taggart, the

employer did not participate in the day-to-day administration of
the program, did not endorse the program, and only made payments
to the insurance company.
In addition, the reasoning in Taggart has been universally
discredited, with any supportive opinions generally limited to the
Fifth Circuit.

In Donovan v Dillingham. 688 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir.

1982), the Eleventh Circuit stated that it agreed with Taggart only
insofar as its holding is "interpreted to mean ERISA does not
regulate the purchase of health insurance where there is no welfare
plan."

Yet, Donovan disagreed with any interpretation of Taggart

which would imply that an ERISA plan cannot be established if an
employer merely purchases a group health insurance policy.

The

Donovan court reasoned that the purchase of insurance did not
conclusively establish the existence of a plan, but it was evidence
of a plan, and the purchase of a "group" policy covering a class
of employees, such as the policy purchased by Mountain States,
offered substantial evidence that a plan had been established. Id.
at 1373. See also, Wickman v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 908
F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990).
more persuasive.
Cal.App.3d

380

Most courts find the Donovan rationale

See, Rizzi v. Blue Cross of So. California, 2 06
(1988).

Mountain States did purchase a group
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benefit plan and offered single coverage, for which it would pay,
to all of its employees.
In Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1077, plaintiff attempted to rely on
Taggart to show that the plan provided by her husband's employer
was not an ERISA-covered

Plan.

The First Circuit found it

significant that in Taggart there was only one employee covered
under the insurance and that it was the employer's only employee.
Wickman further states that Taggart should not be interpreted to
stand

for

the

proposition

"that

an

employer

or

employee

organization that only purchases a group health insurance policy
or subscribes

to a

[multi-employer

trust] to provide health

insurance to its employees or members cannot be said to have
established or maintained an employee welfare benefit plan."
at 1083, citing to Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1375.

Id.

"Taggart is merely

a recognition that ERISA is not intended to cover situations where
the

employer

merely

'advertises'

insurance,

and

then

makes

voluntary deductions from the employees' paychecks." Wickman, 908
F.2d at 1083.
Mountain States did more than merely advertise insurance. It
actively

sought

out group health

employees and, unlike the employer

insurance

coverage

for its

in Taggart, paid

for its

employees' single coverage. Paying the employees' premiums is much
different than making voluntary deductions from its employees'
paychecks.
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In Lambert v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins, Co,, 259 Cal.Rptr. 398
(Cal.

App.3d

1989),

the plaintiff's employer

secured medical

insurance coverage* for its employees by subscribing to a multiemployer trust which was underwritten by Pacific Mutual Life,
similar to the facts in the case at bar.

The employer paid the

employees1 premiums but did not contribute for dependent coverage.
In an affidavit opposing Pacific Mutual"s motion for summary
judgment, the former president of the plaintiff's employer stated
that he never attempted to establish any type of employee benefit
plan under ERISA or to assume responsibility for or administer an
ERISA plan.

The ex-president further stated that he never filed

any reports or information pursuant to ERISA.

The trial court

construed the motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment
on the pleadings and granted Pacific Mutual's motion, finding that
the Pacific Mutual plan was an ERISA plan and that all the
plaintiff's causes of action based on California common law were
pre-empted.
The

Id. at 401.

California

Court

of

Appeals

affirmed

relying

upon

Department of Labor Regulations set forth in 29 C.F.R § 2510.3l(j) (1987).

These Regulations state that 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) does

"not include group insurance offered by an insurer to employers or
members of an employee organization, when four criteria exist with
respect to the program:
(1)

No contributions are made by an employer or an
employee organization;
28

(2)

Participation
[in] the program is completely
voluntary for the employees or members;

(3)

The sole function of the employer or employee
organization with respect to the program are,
without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer
to publicize the program to employees or members,
to collect premiums through payroll deductions,
reduce checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer;
and

(4)

The employer or employee organization receives no
consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in
connection with the program other than reasonable
compensation,
excluding
any
profit
for
administrative
services
actually
rendered
in
connection with the payroll deduction reduced
checkoffs.

Id. at 402.
established

The court went on to find that Pacific Mutual had
a ERISA plan.

The employer paid the premiums for

employee coverage through the date of the termination of insurance,
the

trust

intended

to

create

an

ERISA plan

tacitly, if not expressly, endorsed the plan.

and

the

employer

The fact that the

employer's former president was not familiar with ERISA or the
employer's obligations under ERISA "incident to the plan, does not
refute the endorsement.
employer's

subjective

consistent with ERISA."

A test of an ERISA plan based on an
intent

is

neither

legally

sound

nor

Id. at 403.

Mountain States did more than merely permit Gem to advertise,
and Mountain States did not merely collect premiums through payroll
deductions or dues check offs, but made the contributions for its
employees itself.

Such actions by Mountain States establish the

existence of an ERISA plan under the Department of Labor Regulation
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found at 29 CFR § 2510.3-l(j) (1987) and within the reasoning of
Lambert.
The Robertsons cite in support of their argument a recent
California Appellate Court case, Sayble v. Blue Cross of So.
California, 255 Cal. Rptr. 144

(Cal. App. 1989), opinion on

rehearing, 256 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. App. 1989), an ill-reasoned
and distinguishable, case, which found that an ERISA-regulated plan
did not exist under the facts of that case.

Ironically, the Court

utilized the same standards consistently utilized by federal and
state courts across the country, where ERISA plans were found in
fact situations where the employers were far less involved than
Mountain States.

The California Court of Appeals found that no

ERISA-regulated plan existed under its fact situation.

However,

in Sayble, there was no written or oral commitment by the employer
to provide health insurance to its employees. Accordingly, Sayble
is inapposite and should be ignored.
The Robertsons cite Turnbow v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
765 P. 2d 1160 (Nev. 1988). Turnbow relies heavily on the generally
discredited logic found within Taggart. In Turnbow the Robertsons
find their requirement that in order to establish an ERISA plan it
needs to be shown that an employer intended to guarantee the
continued furnishing of the benefits.

Such a requirement has not

been found necessary by other courts to establish the existence of
an ERISA plan. In fact, if a guarantee of the continued furnishing
of benefits was required, only benefits given to employees pursuant
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to

labor-management

coverage.

negotiations

would

be

subject

to

ERISA

ERISA coverage is simply not so limited.

In addition, Turnbow can be distinguished on the fact that the
court found that the plaintiff was not an employee within the
meaning of ERISA. The Turnbow court relied on Dodd v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 688 F.Supp. 564, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1988), in
stating that if the plaintiff is not an employee she cannot be a
participant or benefit in an ERISA plan.

The Turnbow court went

on to find that plaintiff was not an employee under ERISA as she
was self-employed.

Turnbow, 765 P.2d at 1162.

In the instant

case, Craig Robertson was an employee of Mountain States, not self
employed nor a sole proprietor.

As such, Turnbow is not on point

and should be disregarded for the purposes of this appeal.
All the cases the Robertsons have cited which they claim hold
that

a

Plan was

not

established

by

an employer

are

either

distinguishable (Fort Halifax Packing, Taggart Corp.) or they predate the Donovan and Pilot Life cases.

(Wayne v. Columbus Agency

Service Corp.. 657 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
The final argument the Robertsons make, as sort of a "tag end"
to their claim that ERISA does not govern Mountain States1 Plan in
the case at bar, is the House Report set forth on page 13 of their
opening Brief.

This report was issued shortly after ERISA was

enacted and well before Donovan, Pilot Life and their progeny were
decided.

Prior to the issuance of this House Report, there was

very little federal case law concerning ERISA.
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Since the House

Report was issued, almost every federal court in the nation that
has had an opportunity to interpret the provisions of ERISA has
interpreted them in support of Gem's position in this case.

The

obvious retort is that if Congress wishes to articulate remedies
different than those expressly set forth in ERISA, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court in Pilot Life and other courts
throughout the nation, then the federal courts will take note of
it.
The undisputed facts in this case, within the context of
extensive federal and state case law defining an employee welfare
benefit plan and determining what plans are regulated by ERISA,
support the Lower Court's decision that Mountain States' group
health insurance policy was regulated by ERISA.

The Robertsons

agree that if Mountain States' group health insurance policy is
regulated by ERISA, all of the Robertsons' claims against Gem,
except for the denial of benefits claim, are pre-empted and were
properly dismissed.
health

insurance

Accordingly, because Mountain States' group

policy

is

regulated

by

ERISA,

all

of

the

Robertsons' claims against Gem, other than the denial of benefits
claim, are pre-empted by ERISA and were properly dismissed as a
matter of law.

32

III. The
Lower
Court
properly
limited
the
Robertsons1 award of attorneys1 fees solely to
those issues upon which they prevailed.
A.

The Robertsons have accepted the benefits of the judgment with
regard to attorneys1 fees and are therefore estopped from
attacking the judgment on appeal.
On or about September 6, 1990, Gem sent the Robertsons a check

in the amount of $13,764.22 in full satisfaction of the judgment
entered against Gem on September 5, 1990. The Robertsons, through
their attorney, executed a Notice of Judgment and Satisfaction of
Judgment on September 11, 1990, thus receiving the benefit of the
judgment by accepting payment thereon.

The law in Utah is well

settled that one who accepts the benefit of a judgment may not
attack that judgment on appeal. Jacobsen Const, v. St. Joseph High
School, 794 P.2d 505 (Utah App. 1990).
In Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973), this Court
stated:

"We are in agreement with the general rule that if a

judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment
satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal
is waived."

This Court went on to note that an exception to the

general rule is where one part of the controversy is separate and
distinct from another part, appeal may be taken on that separate
issue.

Here the issues of attorneys' fees is not separate nor

distinct from the judgment which was entered, but was ruled on by
the Lower Court. Thus, the exception to the general rule as to the
attorneys1 fees issue is not present.
at 506, 507.

Jacobsen Const., 794 P.2d

In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987),
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this court refused to reach the merits of a dispute because the
appellant lost "his right to appeal by acquiescing in and accepting
the benefits under the judgment . . . ."

Hence, in the present

case, the Robertsons may not appeal the attorneys1 fees issue,
having accepted the benefit of payment of the judgment. Of course,
having paid the judgment, Gem could not have cross-appealed the
Lower Court's ruling in favor of the Robertsons on their claim of
wrongful denial of insurance benefits.
The reasoning for the "accepting of benefits" doctrine is
well-stated in Trees:
An appellant who accepts the benefit of a
judgment
from
which
he
is
appealing
accomplishes a significant shift in the burden
of risk; he exposes the respondent to the
possibility of not only a possible loss on
appeal, but also the potential loss of the
benefits he has provided the appellant.
Id. at 613.

Gem has provided a benefit to the Robertsons in that

it has paid the Robertsons their attorneys' fees awarded.

Should

this Court remand the issue of the Robertsons1 entitlement to
attorneys' fees, Gem may have to recover the funds that it has paid
out from the Robertsons, who may not be willing or able to refund
it, exposing Gem to the further cost of a collection suit. Indeed,
had Gem known the P.obertsons were going to appeal their award of
attorneys' fees, Gem would not have paid the Lower Court's judgment
and would have cross-appealed.
The Robertsons now claim that only a portion of the case is
at rest.

They claim that the issue of attorneys' fees remains
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viable even though the Satisfaction of Judgment drafted by the
Robertsons' counsel fails to reference any intention to preserve
the right of appeal upon any portion of the case. The Satisfaction
of Judgment reads in its pertinent part: " . . . Plaintiffs further
acknowledge

satisfaction

of the

same judgment by payment of

Defendant to Plaintiff in the amount of $13,764.22."
In Hollinasworth v. Farmers Insurance Co., 655 P. 2d 637 (Utah
1982), the Utah Supreme Court refused to sanction such tactics.
There, a judgment creditor drafted a general satisfaction of
judgment with no reference to an intent to appeal any portion of
the case.

Thereafter, the judgment creditor attempted to appeal

a portion of the judgment. This court refused to allow the appeal,
ruling that absent contrary expression regarding the satisfaction
of judgment, the matter was completely at rest and the right to
appeal foreclosed.
In Dooley v. Cal-Cut Pipe and Supply, Inc. , 593 P.2d 360 (Col.
1979), the Court addressed the issue of attorneys1 fees in the
context of satisfaction and acquiescence in the judgment.
trial

court

entered

judgment

for the plaintiff

awarding damages in the amount of $16,880.97.

The

after trial,

Furthermore, the

judgment provided that the plaintiff was entitled to a postjudgment hearing on additional attorneys' fees.

The parties

entered into an agreement wherein for consideration of a payment
of $17,008.20 the plaintiff agreed to entry of a satisfaction of
judgment. However, a few months later, the plaintiff recanted and
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filed a motion for attorneys' fees.

The trial court held that the

plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing on additional attorneys'
fees due to the fact that he had executed a satisfaction of
judgment. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, stating
that a satisfaction of judgment is the end of a proceeding.
court also stated:

The

"Had the plaintiff intended not to release its

claim to additional attorneys' fees, the satisfaction could have
been so limited. No such limiting phrases were used." Id. at 362.
In addition, the Robertsons could have preserved their right
to appeal the attorneys' fees portion of the judgment by offering
to

accept

payment

for

the

insurance

benefits

withheld

plus

interest, but refusing to accept payment for their attorneys' fees.
If the Robertsons had desired to preserve their right to appeal the
attorneys' fees portion of the Lower Court's decision, they should
have so limited the Satisfaction of Judgment drafted by their
attorney.

Gem should not be placed in the position, after having

attempted to put this matter to rest, of being faced with the
additional potential liability of either having to pay additional
attorneys'

fees or instituting a new action to recover fees

previously awarded and paid to the Robertsons and vacated by this
Court.
Other jurisdictions have found that acquiescence in a judgment
is sufficient to cut off a right of appeal.

See, First National

Bank of Wichita v. Fink. 736 P.2d 909, 911 (Kan. 1987) (". . . a
party to litigation who acquiesces in judgment of a Trial Court,
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either by assuming the burdens of such judgment or by accepting the
benefits thereof, will be deemed to have acquiesced in the judgment
and may not thereafter adopt an inconsistent position and appeal
from such judgment") ; Hart v. Jett Enterprises, Inc,f 744 P.2d 561,
562 (Okl. 1985) (H[A]ctual payment of a judgment in full to a
person authorized to receive it operates as a discharge of the
judgment").
In Adams v. Unterkircher, 714 P.2d

193

(Okl. 1985), the

parties disputed the matter in which the trial court awarded
attorneys1

fees in a partition action.

However, prior to the

appeal, the appealing party collected and cashed the county clerk's
vouchers which were issued pursuant to the trial court's decision
in payment of their fees.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that

by cashing the vouchers, the party waived the right to file an
appeal.

"[L]itigants who voluntarily accept the fruits of a

judgment cannot bring an appeal to reverse it because acceptance
of the benefit of a part of the judgment favorable to an appellant
waives the right to appeal its detrimental parts.11

Id. at 196.

See also, Tara Oil Co. v. Kennedy and Mitchell, Inc., 622 P.2d 1076
(Okl. 1981).

In the case at bar, the Lower Court awarded the

Robertsons attorneys1 fees on the issues on which they prevailed.
Gem then issued a check to the Robertsons covering the benefits
withheld, interest, costs and attorneys1 fees.

This check was

accepted by the Robertsons and cashed, and the Satisfaction of
Judgment entered.

The Robertsons have voluntarily accepted the
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fruits of the judgment concerning attorneys1 fees and should not
now be able to bring an appeal to reverse or enhance that judgment•
Gem issued a check to the Robertsons and sent it to Jeffery
Peatross,

the

Robertsons' counsel, along

with

correspondence

stating that acceptance of this payment would constitute full
satisfaction of the judgment.

See, Addendum C.

The check was

accepted and cashed, and a Satisfaction of Judgment was filed.
Such actions constitute an acquiescence and acceptance of the
judgment and therefore, the Robertsons have waived their right to
appeal the attorneys' fee award in this matter.
B.

The Robertsons have accepted a portion of the attorneys' fees
which was in dispute, thereby waiving their right to appeal
any errors involved in rendering the judgment as to attorneys'
fees.
The Robertsons prayed for an award of attorneys' fees they

incurred

in pursuit of their claims.

The Lower Court heard

testimony and took evidence as to the amount of time spent by the
Robertsons' counsel, and the reasonable value of those services.
The Lower Court then awarded the Robertsons attorneys' fees for
the time spent by their counsel on the issues on which they
prevailed, citing Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 776 P.2d 643.
See, Memorandum Decision R. 243.
Gem then paid the Robertsons, as part of the judgment, the
attorneys1 fees awarded by the Lower Court, which the Robertsons
accepted even though they now dispute the amount.

If a party

accepts payment of a judgment, any portion of which is in dispute,
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that party waives all errors concerning that judgment.

See, 169

A.L.R. 1047, and authorities cited therein.
In Ballinaer v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 N.W. 767
(Iowa

19 02),

attorneys1

the

plaintiff

accepted

a

fees in the amount of $100.00

disputed

payment

of

(the plaintiff had

previously claimed attorneys1 fees in the amount of $150.00).

The

court held that by accepting the amount of the judgment awarded her
(minus attorneys1 fees awarded plaintiff) , the plaintiff had waived
her right of appeal because upon a reversal she might possibly
receive less.

"A portion of the amount drawn by [the plaintiff]

was in dispute, and receiving it . . . was a waiver of the errors
involved in receiving the judgment." Id. at 768. Also, acceptance
of the attorneys1 fees by the attorney waives his client's right
to appeal that judgment.
App. 1945).

Kneble v. Kneble, 189 S.W.2d 464 (Mo.

If the Robertsons' appeal on the issue of attorneys'

fees is entertained, it is possible that they may not ultimately
be successful in the action, or may be awarded a different amount
as attorneys' fees.

Root v. Heil, 43 N.W. Rptr. 278 (Iowa 1889).

The Robertsons disputed the amount of attorneys' fees they
were awarded by the Lower Court. However, they willingly accepted
Gem's check, including portions thereof relating to payment of
those attorneys' fees.

It is inappropriate, and contrary to

prevailing case law, for the Robertsons to accept payment of the
attorneys' fees awarded by the Lower Court and then have the right
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to appeal the Lower Court's judgment as to attorneys' fees,
Knebel, 189 S.W.2d at 467.
C.

The Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorneys1 fees to the Robertsons only on those issues on
which they prevailed.
The Robertsons maintain in their opening brief that any award

for attorneys' fees should have been granted under ERISA, not under
state law. After finding that Gem wrongfully denied the Robertsons
insurance benefits, the Lower Court concluded that the Robertsons
were entitled to their attorneys' fees for time spent by their
counsel upon the issues on which they prevailed.

In doing so, the

Lower Court relied on state law, citing the Utah Court of Appeals
decision in Mountain States Broadcasting, 776 P.2d 643. The Lower
Court apparently was relying on footnote 10 of that_opinion, which
states:
Of course, a reasonable fee will compensate NBA
[the prevailing party] only for those fees
necessarily incurred in resolution of issues
in NBA's favor, and should not include fees
relating to the issues resolved in Mountain
States' favor.
See, Stacey Properties v.
Wixen, 766 P.d 1080, 1085 (Utah App. 1988)
(party entitled to attorneys' fee "was entitled
to attorneys' fees for the claims on which it
was successful").
Mountain States Broadcasting, 776 at n.10.
ERISA provides for attorneys' fees: "In any action under this
title . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court
in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorneys' fee and costs
of action to either party."

29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (emphasis
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added).

In construing this section of ERISA, courts have developed

a five factor test. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
The five factors include:
(1) The degree of the offending parties1
culpability or bad faith;
(2) The degree of the ability of the offending
parties to personally satisfy an award of
attorneys' fees;
(3) Whether or not an award of attorneys' fees
against the offending parties would deter other
persons acting under similar circumstances;
(4) The amount of the benefit conferred on the
members of the pension plan as a whole; and
(5) The relative
position.
Id. at 465.

merits

of

the

parties'

However, the Eaves factors are only some of the

factors a trial court may consider. Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co.,
634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980).
The Eaves factors are only used to determine whether an award
of attorneys' fees is appropriate, not the amount.

U.N.C. Teton

Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 593 (Wyo.
1989).

Once the court has determined

whether

an award

of

attorneys' fees is appropriate, it must make findings concerning
the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to award according to
state law.

Id.

Gem admits that the

Lower

Court

did not rely on 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(1) or the five factors set forth in Eaves in making its
decision to award attorneys' fees to the Robertsons. However, Gem
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submits that this is harmless error.

The Lower Court did award

attorneys1 fees to the Robertsons and made specific findings as to
the reasonableness of these fees.

Under the rules of appellate

review, this Court can affirm the Lower Court on any proper ground,
even if the Lower Court assigned an incorrect reason for its
ruling.
1979) .

Alphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P. 2d 860, 861 (Utah
Furthermore, this Court can affirm the Lower Court on

grounds argued for the first time on appeal. Buehner Block Co. v.
U.W.C. Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).

On this basis,

Gem submits that the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in
the amount of attorneys' fees it awarded the Robertsons.
Merely

because

a

party

prevails

under

ERISA

does

not

automatically mean that party is entitled to an award of attorneys'
fees.

Overcash v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina,

381 S.E.2d 330, 339 (N.C. App. 1989).

Because, under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(1), it is within the trial court's discretion to award
attorneys'

fees

to

either

party,

courts

have

held

that

institutional defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees from
individual plaintiffs where the defendant has shown that the
plaintiff brought the action in bad faith or that the action was
frivolous.

Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc. for Cancer Control,

653 F.Supp. 1072 (S.D. Ohio 1986).

In the case at bar, the Lower

Court did not award attorneys' fees to Gem, but simply held that
the Robertsons were not entitled to their attorneys' fees on the
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issues on which they did not prevail.

This is within the Lower

Court!s discretion.
In Bittner v. Sadoff and Rudoy Industries, 728 F.2d 820 (7th
Cir.

1984), the court adopted the Eaves five factor test for

evaluating requests for attorneys1 fees and costs under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(1), in the case where the plaintiff prevails and seeks
an award of attorneys1 fees.

Id. at 829. But Bittner proposed an

alternative test under which fees are to be awarded to the
prevailing defendant. Id. at 829. The Bittner test for prevailing
defendants was derived from the Equal Access to Justice Act, 2 8
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which entitles a prevailing party to a
reasonable attorneys1 fee.
889 F.2d

115

In Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc. ,

(7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh

Circuit Court in

addressing both the Eaves test and the Bittner prevailing defendant
test stated:
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which
the application of one test rather than the
other would alter our decision concerning the
propriety of an award of costs or fees. Both
tests are designed to award costs and fees to
the prevailing party where there is reason to
believe that the losing party engaged in the
litigation really to harass its opponent.
Furthermore, as we noted in Marquardt v. North
American Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1981), a denial of fees will seldom constitute
an abuse of discretion.
Nichol 889 F.2d at 122.

(Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, the

Lower Court found that the Robertsons were the prevailing party and
awarded attorneys1 fees to them only on the issue of wrongful
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denial of insurance benefits.

Even if the Lower Court had made a

determination to award the Robertsons fees pursuant to ERISA,
rather

than

under

state

law,

it

could

have

used

the

same

"prevailing party" rationale to arrive at the amount of attorneys1
fees awarded.

It is difficult to see how such an award can be

viewed as an abuse of the Lower Court's discretion.
In applying the Eaves factors to the case at bar, it becomes
clear that the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in its
decision to award attorneys' fees to the Robertsons only on the
issue on which they prevailed.

Factor one refers to the easy case

where the position of the party opposing the* application for
attorneys' fees is frivolous. Bittner, 728 F.2d at 829. It cannot
be said that Gem"s defense of the Robertsons' Complaint was
frivolous.

Gem prevailed on the existence of an ERISA Plan and

ERISA pre-emption as to the Robertsons' state common law and
statutory causes of action in the Lower Court.
Under factor two, Gem does not dispute that it has the ability
to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; as noted above, it already
has.

Under factor three, the award of attorneys1 fees against Gem

would not deter other persons acting under similar circumstances.
Gem made its decision to deny coverage to the Robertsons based upon
the particular facts of Mrs. Robertson's injury and her own medical
records.

Because

Gem's

decision

was

made

on

a

factual

interpretation and not a legal interpretation of ERISA, it is
unlikely that the award of additional attorneys' fees to the
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Robertsons would have a deterrent effect on Gem, let alone other
parties faced with similar circumstances.
It is significant that under factor four of Eaves, the
Robertsons have not sought to benefit anyone other than themselves
or to

resolve

a significant

legal

question

regarding ERISA.

Therefore, under this factor the Robertsons would not be entitled
to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
and the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Robertsons their attorneys' fees on the issue on which they did
not prevail.

Blanton v. Anzalone, 760 F.2d 989, 992 (9th Cir.

1985) .
The law concerning the award of attorneys1 fees within a civil
rights case is applicable to ERISA. Bueno v. CF&I Steel Corp., 773
P.2d 937, 941 (Wyo. 1989).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, plaintiffs

bringing civil rights actions may be awarded attorneys' fees.
Courts have held that factors considered in awarding attorneys'
fees

to

civil

rights

plaintiffs

may

be

used

in

making

a

determination whether attorneys' fees are properly awarded under
ERISA.

In civil rights cases plaintiffs are entitled to their

attorneys' fees when they are the prevailing party.

Von Clark v.

Butler, 916 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1990).
In Von Clark, the court ruled that the plaintiff was only
entitled to fees for those hours reasonably expended in pursuing
the claims on which he was successful.
prevail

on

a claim

that

"When a plaintiff fails to

is separate
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and

distinct

from his

successful claims, the hours expended on the unsuccessful claim
should be excluded from the calculation of a reasonable fee." Id.
at 259.

The issue of the existence of an ERISA Plan that the

Robertsons are appealing is a separate and distinct issue from the
issue

of wrongful

denial

of

insurance benefits.

Since the

Robertsons were not successful on their defense of Gem's Motion to
Dismiss, they are not entitled to attorneys' fees for the time
spent in opposition to that motion.
In Marquardt v. North American Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 717
(7th Cir. 1981), the court stated:
But an award of attorneys' fees under ERISA
also differs significantly from an attorneys'
fees award under the Civil Rights Act,, We do
not hold that these five factors constitute the
only test which district court can use in
whether to award attorneys' fees under ERISA.
Under the ERISA attorneys' fees provision, unlike under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, it cannot be said that the purpose of the provision is to
allow prevailing plaintiffs to obtain an award of attorneys' fees
almost as a matter of course, but awarding prevailing defendants
fees only if the suit was frivolous.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 indicates a clear legislative history that
the purpose for the enactment of the statute was to encourage
meritorious civil rights litigation.

Bittner, 728 F.2d at 829.

"There is nothing comparable in the legislative history of ERISA;
nor do pension plan participants and beneficiaries constitute a
vulnerable

group whose members need
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special

encouragement to

exercise their legal rights, like a racial minority."

Id.

The

Bittner court goes on to state:
It does not follow that whoever wins, plaintiff
or defendant, is entitled to attorney's fees
as a matter of course under § 1132(g)(1). If
that was the legislators' intention they
expressed it very badly by giving the district
court "discretion" to award or not award fees.
Almost certainly it was not their intention.
It would be tantamount to adopting the English
(and Continental) rule that the winning party
to a lawsuit is automatically awarded a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Not only has
American common law, state and federal,
steadfastly refused to adopt the English rule,
[citations omitted], but it is very difficult
to find among the federal fee-shifting
statutes, numerous as they now are, ones that
adopted it.
Id. at 830.
Gem is not claiming in this appeal, unlike the defendant in
Bittner, that it is entitled to its attorneys' fees below; rather,
the Robertsons were awarded their attorneys' fees below on the
issues on which they prevailed, the award was reasonable, and under
no circumstances would the Robertsons be entitled to an award of
all of their attorneys' fees as a matter of course.

Although the

Lower Court did not make express findings as to the Eaves factors,
this was harmless error and the amount of the award of attorneys'
fees awarded by the Lower Court should be upheld.
Under the ERISA provisions authorizing an award of attorneys1
fees, the right to an award of attorneys' fees is determined by
federal law. However, the procedures for proof and computation of
the amount of attorneys' fees properly awarded is a matter of state

law.

UNC Teton Exploration Drilling v. Pevton. 774 P.2d 584, 593

(Wyo. 1989).

"To receive that award, the party must prevail and

the fee awarded should be determined by the trial court to be
reasonable." Id. at 594f 595. The party claiming attorneys' fees
should first present the court with an itemized billing reflecting
the

attorney's

time

and

rate.

The

determination

of

the

reasonableness of the rate is within the discretion of the trial
court and the burden of proving the reasonableness of the fee
requested rests with the claimant.

Id. at 595.

In the case at bar, the Lower Court received evidence of the
Robertsons' counsel's hours spent on the case, and a requested
hourly rate of $95 per hour. The Lower Court then determined that
a reasonable rate in the Provo, Utah area for the Robertsons'
counsel was $65.00 per hour. The determination by the Lower Court
as to the attorney's reasonable hourly rate was within the sound
discretion of that Court.
additional

discretionary

The Lower Court went on to make an
ruling that the Robertsons were not

entitled to attorneys' fees on the matters on which they did not
prevail. This decision was also within the sound discretion of the
Lower Court and is supported by Utah precedent.

Stacey Properties

v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, while
the Lower Court may have applied the incorrect legal standard in
deciding whether an award of attorneys' fees was proper, it did
make proper findings as to the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees
to which the Robertsons were entitled.
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In Herbst v. Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., 781 P.2d
762, 764 (Nev. 1989), the court stated:
The five factors mentioned in Hummell [similar
to the Eaves factors] are used only to
determine whether or not attorney's fees should
be awarded in a case governed by ERISA. There
are no cases which stand for the proposition
that the Hummell factors should be used to
determine the amount of the attorney's fees to
be awarded.
The court went on to state that after a court has decided that an
award of attorneys' fees is appropriate, then it must multiply the
number of hours reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly
rate, commonly termed the lode star amount.

Id.

There is both Federal and State precedent supporting the Lower
Court's award of attorneys' fees to the Robertsons only on the
issues on which they prevailed.

A factor to be considered in the

amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded by the trial court is the
amount of time expended on claims upon which the party prevailed.
Riemersma, 655 P. 2d at 1110.

This Court has held that, under

appropriate circumstances, where a party is unsuccessful on certain
claims, attorneys' fees incurred in prosecution of those claims may
not be recovered.

Paul Mueller Co. , 657 P. 2d at 1288.

Where a

plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that -is distinct at all
from his successful claims, he should not be entitled to attorneys'
fees

for work done on the unsuccessful

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).
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claims.

Henselv v.

In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), this
Court set forth factors for trial courts to use in determining the
amount of attorneys' fees properly awarded.

The Lower Court took

evidence as to those factors and determined that $4,192.50 was a
reasonable attorney's fee in this matter.

In doing so, the Lower

Court limited the Robertsons' award of attorneys' fees to those
issues on which they prevailed.

See, Occidental/Nebraska Fed.

Savings v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990),.

The Trial Court

did

the

not

abuse

its

discretion

in determining

amount

of

attorneys' fees awarded to the Robertsons.
The Trial Court did award the Robertsons their attorneys'
fees, even though the Lower Court did not make findings as the
appropriatness of the fees under the ERISA standard.

However, had

it used the ERISA standard, the Lower Court could have come to the
exact same result, that the Robertsons were entitled to an award
of fees. The Lower Court would then look to state law to determine
the amount of those attorneys' fees.

In doing so, it could, as it

did, limit the Robertsons' award of attorneys' fees only to those
issues on which they prevailed.

Gem therefore submits that this

Court should uphold the Lower Court's award of attorneys' fees to
the Robertsons on the alternate ground that because attorneys' fees
were awarded and the appropriate findings, pursuant to state law,
were made as to the reasonableness of those fees, the Lower Court's
utilization of a state law standard rather than an ERISA standard
was not reversable error.
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IV.

The Robertsons1 appeal is so frivolous that Gem
should be awarded double costs, including its
reasonable attorneys1 fees.

Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
as follows:
. . . if the court determines that a motion
made or appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award
just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorneys1 fees, to the prevailing
party.
In O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987), the
Court of Appeals defined a frivolous appeal as "one having no
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a)."

The

Court of Appeals realized that this may create a lesser standard
than the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953, as
amended) , but "since a party has already been to court once and has
had the benefit of one ruling, the decision to appeal should be
reached only after careful consideration by the party and counsel."
O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 310. See, Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah
1953) (construing the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2756 (1953, as amended)).
In Barber v. Imporium Partnership, 750 P. 2d 202 (Utah App.
1988), the court awarded the plaintiff costs and attorneys' fees,
finding that the defendant failed to make a timely appeal.

While

the Robertsons have made a timely appeal, they are appealing the
attorneys1 fees award in a judgment from which they sought payment
and filed a Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment.
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This makes the

Robertsons' position as egregious as that of the defendant in
Barber,

In addition, the Robertsons are appealing the Lower

Court's decision that ERISA pre-empts their state common law and
statutory causes of action.

The Robertsons bring this appeal

against the overwhelming majority of precedent; therefore their
appeal is frivolous.
The Court of Appeals has also cited with approval Auburn
Harpswell Ass'n v. Day, 438 A.2d 234 (Maine 1981), which case
examines when the imposition of sanctions is appropriate.
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988).

Porco

The court in Day

said that sanctions should be applied when:
an appeal is obviously without merit and has
been taken with no reasonable likelihood of
prevailing
and
results
in
delayed
implementation of the judgment of the lower
court; increased costs of the litigation; and
dispensation of time and resources of the lower
court.
Day, 438 A.2d at 339. The Robertsons have certainly increased the
costs of litigation and caused dispensation

of the time and

resource of both this Court and the Lower Court by appealing their
award of attorneys' fees in a judgment which has been voluntarily
satisfied.
The Robertsons and their counsel could not have reached their
decision to appeal "after careful consideration".

O'Brien, 744

P.2d at 310. Had they carefully considered the facts and law, they
would realized there is no legal or factual basis for their appeal
on either the issue of attorneys' fees or of ERISA pre-emption.
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Backstram Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P. 2d 1157 (Utah App.
1988); Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1988).
The record in this case leaves no doubt that the Robertsons' appeal
is frivolous. Therefore, Gem suggests that this is an appropriate
case in which to award Gem double costs, and remand to the Lower
Court for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Gem on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Gem respectfully requests
that this Court dismiss the Robertsons' appeal, affirm the Lower
Court's decision granting Gem's Motion to Dismiss and awarding the
Robertsons attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,192.50, and award
Gem double its costs incurred in opposing the Robertsons' appeal,
pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this

j\

day of March, 1991.
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW

Jeffrey R/. Orii;t

Kevin J./Fiif

~

,

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Gem Insurance Company
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ADDENDUM A

29 USCS § 1002
§ 1002.

LABOR

Definitions

For purposes of this title:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit
described in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 [29 USCS § 186(c)] (other than pensions on retirement or death,
and insurance to provide such pensions).
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee
pension benefit plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to
the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding
circumstances such plan, fund, or program—
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the
plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the
method of distributing benefits from the plan.
(B) The Secretary may by regulation prescribe rules consistent with
the standards and purposes of this Act providing one or more exempt
categories under which—
(i) severance pay arrangements, and
(ii) supplemental retirement income payments, under which the
pension benefits of retirees or their beneficiaries are supplemented
to take into account some portion or all of the increases in the cost
of living (as determined by the Secretary of Labor) since retirement,
shall, for purposes of this title, be treated as welfare plans rather than
pension plans. In the case of any arrangement or payment a principal
effect of which is the evasion of the standards or purposes of this Act
applicable to pension plans, such arrangement or payment shall be
treated as a pension plan.
(3) The term "employee benefit plan" or "plan" means an employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which
is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension
benefit plan.
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(4) The term "employee organization" means any labor union or any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee, association, group, or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning an employee benefit plan, or other matters incidental to employment relationships; or any employees' beneficiary association organized for the purpose in whole or in part, of establishing such
a plan.
(5) The term "employer" means any person acting directly as an
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers
acting for an employer in such capacity.
(6) The term "employee" means any individual employed by an employer.
(7) The term "participant" means any employee or former employee of
an employer, or any member or former member of an employee
organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any
type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such
employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may
be eligible to receive any such benefit.
(8) The term "beneficiary" means a person designated by a participant,
or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become
entitled to a benefit thereunder.
(9) The term "person" means an individual, partnership, joint venture,
corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or employee organization.
(10) The term "State" includes any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal Zone. The term "United States"
when used in the geographic sense means the States and the Outer
Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (43 U.S.C 1331-1343).
(11) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication between any State and any place outside thereof.
(12) The term "industry or activity affecting commerce" means any
activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute
would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce, and
includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the
meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, or the Railway
Labor Act.
(13) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Labor.
(14) The term "party in interest" means, as to an employee benefit
plan—
(A) any fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any administrator,
officer, trustee, or custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee
benefit plan;
115

29 U S C S § 1002

LABOR

(B) a person providing services to such plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan;
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by
such plan;
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of—
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of a corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or
(hi) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise,
which is an employer or an employee organization described in
subparagraph (C) or (D);
(F) a relative (as defined in paragraph (15)) of any individual
described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E);
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in
which) 50 percent or more of—
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate,
is owned directly or indirectly, or held by persons described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E);
(H) an employee, officer, director (or an individual having powers or
responsibilities similar to those of officers or directors), or a 10
percent or more shareholder directly or indirectly, of a person
described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the
employee benefit plan; or
(I) a 10 percent or more (directly or indirectly in capital or profits)
partner or joint venturer of a person described in subparagraph (B),
(C), (D), (E), or (G).
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary of
the Treasury, may by regulation prescribe a percentage lower than 50
percent for subparagraph (E) and (G) and lower than 10 percent for
subparagraph (H) or (I). The Secretary may prescribe regulations for
determining the ownership (direct or indirect) of profits and beneficial
interests, and the manner in which indirect stockholdings are taken into
account. Any person who is a party in interest with respect to a plan to
which a trust described in section 501(c)(22) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501(c)(22)] is permitted to make payments
under section 4223 [29 USCS § 1403] shall be treated as a party in
interest with respect to such trust.
(15) The term "relative" means a spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, or
spouse of a lineal descendant.
(16)(A) The term "administrator" means—
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the
instrument under which the plan is operated;
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(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not
designated and a plan sponsor cannot be identified, such other
person as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.
(B) The term "plan sponsor" means (i) the employer in the case of an
employee benefit plan established or maintained by a single employer,
(ii) the employee organization in the case of a plan established or
maintained by an employee organization, or (iii) in the case of a plan
established or maintained by two or more employers or jointly by one
or more employers and one or more employee organizations, the
association, committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar group
of representatives of the parties who establish or maintain the plan.
(17) The term "separate account" means an account established or
maintained by an insurance company under which income, gains, and
losses, whether or not realized, from assets allocated to such account,
are, in accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged
against such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of
the insurance company.
(18) The term "adequate consideration" when used in part 4 of subtitle
B [29 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] means (A) in. the case of a security for
which there is a generally recognized market, either (i) the price of the
security prevailing on a national securities exchange which is registered
under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 USCS § 78fj,
or (ii) if the security is not traded on such a national securities
exchange, a price not less favorable to the plan than the offering price
for the security as established by the current bid and asked prices
quoted by persons independent of the issuer and of any party in interest;
and (B) in the case of an asset other than a security for which there is a
generally recognized market, the fair market value of the asset as
determined in good faith by the trustee or named fiduciary pursuant to
the terms of the plan and in accordance with regulations promulgated
by the Secretary.
(19) The term "nonforfeitable" when used with respect to a pension
benefit or right means a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension
plan which arises from the participant's service, which is unconditional,
and which is legally enforceable against the plan. For purposes of this
paragraph, a right to an accrued benefit derived from employer contributions shall not be treated as forfeitable merely because the plan contains
a provision described in section 203(a)(3) [29 USCS § 1053(a)(3)].
(20) The term "security" has the same meaning as such term has under
section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(l)).
(21)(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a
fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
117

29 USCS § 1002

LABOR

management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect
to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such
term includes any person designated under section 405(c)(1)(B) [29
USCS § 1105(c)(1)(B)].
(B) If any money or other property of an employee benefit plan is
invested in securities issued by an investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, such investment shall
not by itself cause such investment company or such investment
company's investment adviser or principal underwriter to be deemed
to be a fiduciary or a party in interest as those terms are defined in
this title, except insofar as such investment company or its investment
adviser or principal underwriter acts in connection with an employee
benefit plan covering employees of the investment company, the
investment adviser, or its principal underwriter. Nothing contained in
this subparagraph shall limit the duties imposed on such investment
company, investment adviser, or principal underwriter by any other
law.
(22) The term "normal retirement benefit,, means the greater of the
early retirement benefit under the plan, or the benefit under the plan
commencing at normal retirement age. The normal retirement benefit
shall be determined without regard to—
(A) medical benefits, and
(B) disability benefits not in excess of the qualified disability benefit.
For purposes of this paragraph, a qualified disability benefit is a
disability benefit provided by a plan which does not exceed the benefit
which would be provided for the participant if he separated from the
service at normal retirement age. For purposes of this paragraph, the
early retirement benefit under a plan shall be determined without regard
to any benefit under the plan which the Secretary of the Treasury finds
to be a benefit described in section 204(b)(1)(G) [29 USCS
§ 1054(b)(1)(G)].
(23) The term "accrued benefit" means—
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the individual's accrued
benefit determined under the plan and, except as provided in section
204(c)(3) [29 USCS § 1054(c)(3)], expressed in the form of an amiual
benefit commencing at normal retirement age, or
(B) in the case of a plan which is an individual account plan, the
balance of the individual's account.
The accrued benefit of an employee shall not be less than the amount
determined under section 204(c)(2)(B) [29 USCS § 1054(c)(2)(B)] with respect to the employee's accumulated contribution.
(24) The term "normal retirement age" means the earlier of—
(A) the time a plan participant attains normal retirement age under
the plan, or
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(El) the later of—
(i) the time a plan participant attains age 65, or
(ii) the 5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced
participation in the plan.
(25) The term "vested liabilities" means the present value of the
immediate or deferred benefits available at noimal retirement age for
participants and their beneficiaries which are nonforfeitable.
(26) The term "current value" means fair market value where available
and otherwise the fair value as determined in good faith by a trustee or
a named fiduciary (as defined in section 402(a)(2) [29 USCS
§ 1102(a)(2)]) pursuant to the terms of the plan and in accordance with
regulations of the Secretary, assuming an orderly liquidation at the time
of such determination.
(27) The term "present value", with respect to a liability, means the
value adjusted to reflect anticipated events. Such adjustments shall
conform to such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may
prescribe.
(28) The term "normal service cost" or "normal cost" means the annual
cost of future pension benefits and administrative expenses assigned,
under an actuarial cost method, to years subsequent to a particular
valuation date of a pension plan. The Secretary of the Treasury may
prescribe regulations to carry out this paragraph.
(29) The term "accrued liability" means the excess of the present value,
as of a particular valuation date of a pension plan, of the projected
future benefit costs and administrative expenses for all plan participants
and beneficiaries over the present value of future contributions for the
normal cost of all applicable plan participants and beneficiaries. The
Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations to carry out this
paragraph.
(30) The term "unfunded accrued liability" means the excess of the
accrued liability, under an actuarial cost method which so provides, over
the present value of the assets of a pension plan. The Secretary of the
Treasury may prescribe regulations to carry out this paragraph.
(31) The term "advance funding actuarial cost method" or "actuarial
cost method" means a recognized actuarial technique utilized for establishing the amount and incidence of the annual actuarial cost of pension
plan benefits and expenses. Acceptable actuarial cost methods shall
include the accrued benefit cost method (unit credit method), the entry
age normal cost method, the individual level premium cost method, the
aggregate cost method, the attained age normal cost method, and the
frozen initial liability cost method. The terminal funding cost method
and the current funding (pay-as-you-go) cost method are not acceptable
actuarial cost methods. The Secretary of the Treasury shall issue
regulations to further define acceptable actuarial cost methods.
(32) The term "governmental plan" means a plan established or maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the
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government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any
agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing. The term "governmental plan" also includes any plan to which the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1935 or 1937 applies, and which is financed by contributions
required under that Act and any plan of an international organization
which is exempt from taxation under the provisions of the International
Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669).
(33)(A) The term "church plan" means a plan established and maintained (to the extent required in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B)) for
its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention
or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section
501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501].
(B) The term "church plan" does not include a plan—
(i) which is established and maintained primarily for the benefit of
employees (or their beneficiaries) of such church or convention or
association of churches who are employed in connection with one
or more unrelated trades or businesses (within the meaning of
section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS
§513]), or
(ii) if less than substantially all of the individuals included in the
plan are individuals described in subparagraph (A) or in clause (ii)
of subparagraph (C) (or their beneficiaries).
(C) For purposes of this paragraph—
(i) A plan established and maintained for its employees (or their
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of
churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a
civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program
for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both,
for the employees of a church or a convention or association of
churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a
church or a convention or association of churches,
(ii) The term employee of a church or a convention or association
of churches includes—
(I) a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a
church in the exercise of his ministry, regardless of the source of
his compensation;
(II) an employee of an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] and which
is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or
association of churches; and
(III) an individual described in clause (v).
(iii) A church or a convention or association of churches which is
exempt from tax under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code
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of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] shall be deemed the employer of any
individual included as an employee under clause (ii).
(iv) An organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise,
is associated with a church or a convention or association of
churches if it shares common religious bonds and convictions with
that church or convention or association of churches,
(v) If an employee who is included in a church plan separates from
the service of a church or a convention or association of churches
or an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise,
which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] and which is controlled by
or associated with a church or a convention or association of
churches, the church plan shall not fail to meet the requirements of
this paragraph merely because the plan—
(I) retains the employee's accrued benefit or account for the
payment of benefits to the employee or his beneficiaries pursuant
to the terms of the plan; or
(II) receives contributions on the employee's behalf after the
employee's separation from such service, but only for a period of
5 years after such separation, unless the employee is disabled
(within the meaning of the disability provisions of the church
plan or, if there are no such provisions in the church plan,
within the meaning of section 72(m)(7) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 72(m)(7)] at the time of such separation from service.
(D)(i) If a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of
churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] fails to meet one
or more of the requirements of this paragraph and corrects its
failure to meet such requirements within the correction period, the
plan shall be deemed to meet the requirements of this paragraph
for the year in which the correction was made and for all prior
years.
(ii) If a correction is not made within the correction period, the
plan shall be deemed not to meet; the requirements of this paragraph beginning with the date on which the earliest failure to meet
one or more of such requirements occurred.
(iii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "correction
period" means—
(I) the period ending 270 days after the date of mailing by the
Secretary of the Treasury of a notice of default with respect to
the plan's failure to meet one or more of the requirements of this
paragraph; or
(II) any period set by a court of competent jurisdiction after a
final determination that the plan fails to meet such requirements,
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or, if the court does not specify such period, any reasonable
period determined by the Secretary of the Treasury on the basis
of all the facts and circumstances, but in any event not less than
270 days after the determination has become final; or
(III) any additional period which the Secretary of the Treasury
determines is reasonable or necessary for the correction of the
default,
whichever has the latest ending date.
(34) The term "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan"
means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to
the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses,
and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be
allocated to such participant's account.
(35) The term "defined benefit plan" means a pension plan other than
an individual account plan; except that a pension plan which is not an
individual account plan and which provides a benefit derived from
employer contributions which is based panly on the balance of the
separate account of a participant—
(A) for the purposes of section 202 [29 USCS § 1052], shall be treated
as an individual account plan, and
(B) for the purposes of paragraph (23) of this section and section 204
[29 USCS § 1054], shall be treated as an individual account plan to
the extent benefits are based upon the separate account of a participant and as a defined benefit plan with respect to the remaining
portion of benefits under the plan.
(36) The term "excess benefit plan" means a plan maintained by an
employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed by
section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 415] on
plans to which that section applies, without regard to whether the plan
is funded. To the extent that a separable part of a plan (as determined
by the Secretary of Labor) maintained by an employer is maintained for
such purpose, that part shall be treated as a separate plan which is an
excess benefit plan.
(37)(A) The term "multiemployer plan" means a plan—
(i) to which more than one employer is required to contribute,
(ii) which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more employee organizations and
more than one employer, and
(iii) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, all trades or businesses (whether
or not incorporated) which are under common control within the
meaning of section 4001(b)(1) [29 USCS § 1301(b)(1)] are considered
a single employer.
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(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a plan is a multiemployer
plan on and after its termination date if the plan was a multiemployer
plan under this paragraph for the plan year preceding its termination
date.
(D) For purposes of this title, notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, for any plan year which began before the date
of the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980 [enacted Sept. 26, 1980], the term "multiemployer plan"
means a plan described in section 3(37) of this Act [para. (37) of this
section] as in effect immediately before such date.
(E) Within one year after the date of the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 [enacted Sept. 26,
1980], a multiemployer plan may irrevocably elect, pursuant to
procedures established by the corporation and subject to the provisions of sections 4403 [4303](b) and (c) [29 USCS § 1453(b) and (c)],
that the plan shall not be treated as a multiemployer plan for all
purposes under this Act or the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26
USCS §§ 1 et seq.] if for each of the last 3 plan years ending prior to
the effective date of the Multiemplover Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980—
(i) the plan was not a multiemployer plan because the plan was not
a plan described in section 3(37)(A)(iii) of this Act [para.
(37)(A)(iii) of this section] and section 414(f)(1)(C) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 414(f)(1)(C)] (as such provisions
were in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 [enacted
Sept. 26, 1980]); and
(ii) the plan had been identified as a plan that was not a multiemployer plan in substantially all its filings with the corporation, the
Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury.
(F)(i) For purposes of this title a qualified football coaches plan—
(I) shall be treated as a multiemployer plan to the extent not
inconsistent with the purposes of this subparagraph; and
(II) notwithstanding section 401(k)(4)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 401(k)(4)(B)], may include a
qualified cash and deferred arrangement.
(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "qualified football
coaches plan" means any defined contribution plan which is established and maintained by an organization—
(I) which is described in section 501(c) of such Code [26 USCS
§ 501(c)];
(II) the membership of which consists entirely of individuals
who primarily coach football as full-time employees of 4-year
colleges or universities described in section 170(b)(l)(A)(ii) of
such Code [26 USCS § 170(b)(l)(A)(ii)]; and
(III) which was in existence on September 18, 1986.
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(38) The term "investment manager" means any fiduciary (other than a
trustee or named fiduciary, as defined in section 402(a)(2) [29 USCS
§ 1102(a)(2)])(A) who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset of
a plan;
(B) who is (i) registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 USCS §§ 80b-1 et seq.]; (ii) is a bank,
as defined in that Act [15 USCS §§ 80b-1 et seq.]; or (iii) is an
insurance company qualified to perform services described in subparagraph (A) under the laws of more than one State; and
(C) has acknowledged in writing that he is a fiduciary with respect to
the plan.
(39) The terms "plan year" and "fiscal year of the plan" mean, with
respect to a plan, the calendar, policy, or fiscal year on which the
records of the plan are kept.
(40)(A) The term "multiple employer welfare arrangement" means an
employee welfare benefit plan, or any other arrangement (other than
an employee welfare benefit plan), which is established or maintained
for the purpose of offering or providing any benefit described in
paragraph (1) to the employees of two or more employers (including
one or more self-employed individuals), or to their beneficiaries,
except that such term does not include any such plan or other
arrangement which is established or maintained—
(i) under or pursuant to one or more agreements which the
Secretary finds to be collective bargaining agreements, or
(ii) by a rural electric cooperative.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph—
(i) two or more trades or businesses, whether or not incorporated,
shall be deemed a single employer if such trades or businesses are
within the same control group,
(ii) the term "control group" means a g^oup of trades or businesses
under common control,
(iii) the determination of whether a trade or business is under
"common control" with another trade or business shall be determined under regulations of the Secretary applying principles similar
to the principles applied in determining whether employees of two
or more trades or businesses are treated as employed by a single
employer under section 4001(b) [29 USCS § 1301(b)], except that,
for purposes of this paragraph, common control shall not be based
on an interest of less than 25 percent, and
(iv) the term "rural electric cooperative" means—
(I) any organization which is exempt from tax under section
501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501(a)]
and which is engaged primarily in providing electric service on a
mutual or cooperative basis, and
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(II) any organization described in paragraph (4) or (6) of section
501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS
§ 501(c)(4) or (6)] which is exempt from tax under section 501(a)
of such Code [26 USCS § 501(a)] and at least 80 percent of the
members of which are organizations described in subclause (I).
(41) Single-employer plan. The term "single-employer plan" means an
employee benefit plan other than a multiemployer plan.
(Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, Title I, Subtitle A, § 3, 88 Stat. 833; Sept. 26,
1980, P. L. 96-364, Title III, §§ 302, 305, Title IV, §§ 407(a), 409, 94 Stat.
1291, 1294, 1303, 1307; Jan. 14, 1983, P. L. 97-473, Title III, § 302(a), 96
Stat. 2612; Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11016(c)(1), 100 Stat.
273; Oct. 21, 1986, P. L. 99-509, Title IX, Subtitle C, § 9203(b)(1), 100
Stat. 1979; Oct. 22, 1986, P. L. 99-514, Title XVIII, Subtitle A, Ch 7,
§ 1879(u)(3), 100 Stat. 2913; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L. 100-202, § 136(a), 101
Stat. 1329-441; Dec. 19, 1989, P. L. 101-239, Title VII, Subtitle G, Part V,
Subpart B, § 7871(b)(2), Subpart C, § 7881(m)(2)(D), Subpart D,
§§ 7891(a)(1), 7893(a), 7894(a)(1)(A), (2)(A), (3), (4), 103 Stat. 2435, 2444,
2445, 2447, 2448.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title I of Act Sept. 2, 1974,
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, popularly known as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which appears generally as 29
USCS § 1001-§ 1168. For full classification of this Title, consult USCS
Tables volumes.
"This Act", referred to in this section, is the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829, which appears generally as 29 USCS §§ 1001 et seq. For full
classification of this Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
"The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act", referred to in this section, is
Act Aug. 7, 1953, ch 345, 67 Stat. 462, which is generally classified to
43 USCS §§1331 et seq. For full classification of this Act, consult
USCS Tables volumes.
"The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947", referred to in this
section, is Act June 23, 1947, ch 120, 61 Stat. 136, and appears
generally as 29 USCS §§ 141 et seq. For full classification of such Act,
consult USCS Tables volumes.
"The Railway Labor Act", referred to in this section, is Act May 20,
1926, ch 347, 44 Stat. 577, and appears generally as 45 USCS §§ 151 et
seq. For full classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
"The Investment Company Act of 1940", referred to in this section, is
Act Aug. 22, 1940, ch 686, Title I, 54 Stat. 789, and appears generally
as 15 USCS §§ 80a-1 et seq. For full classification of such Act, consult
USCS Tables volumes.
"The Railroad Retirement Act of 1935 or 1937" or "that Act",
referred to in this section, is Act Aug. 29, 1935, ch 812, 49 Stat. 867,
as amended generally by Act June 24, 1937, ch 382, Part 1, 50 Stat.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Fund trustees are granted stay against discovery in civil action brought by Secretary for
breach of fiduciary duties pending outcome of
Attorney General's investigation suggesting government is preparing to prosecute trustees under
29 USCS § 1131 since possibility trustees would
be unable to defend both actions to fullest since
repeated invocation of right against self-incrimination would hamper ability to defend civil suit
outweighs nsk of harm to public interest in
correcting improprieties m trust management.
Brock v Tolkow (1985, ED NY) 109 FRD 116,
6 EBC 2673.

In prosecution for embezzling funds from
employee pension benefit plan, whether or not
particular fund was "employee pension benefit
fund/* as denned in predecessor of this section
(29 USCS § 1002), was question for jury under
proper instructions. United States v Daley (1972,
CA1 Mass) 454 F2d 505.
Congress did not intend, by enactment of
predecessor of reporting and disclosure provisions of this Act (29 USCS §§ 1021 et seq.), to
confer upon courts broad regulatory power over
operation of welfare funds. Moyer v Kirkpatnck
(1967, ED Pa) 265 F Supp 348, 64 BNA LRRM
2669, 55 CCH LC « 11832, affd (CA3 Pa) 387
F2d 955, 67 BNA LRRM 2139, 57 CCH LC
«[ 12396.

§ 1132. Civil enforcement
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be
brought—
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 409 [29 USCS § 1109];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms
of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate
relief in the case of a violation of 105(c) [29 USCS § 1025(c)];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary (A)
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2)
or (i) or (1).
(b) Plans qualified under Internal Revenue Code; maintenance of actions
involving delinquent contributions. (1) In the case of a plan which is
qualified under section 401(a), 403(a), or 405(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (or with respect to which an application to so qualify has
been filed and has not been finally determined) the Secretary may
exercise his authority under subsection (a)(5) with respect to a violation
of, or the enforcement of, parts 2 and 3 of this subtitle [29 USCS
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§§ 1051 et seq., §§ 1081 et seq.] (relating to participation, vesting, and
funding), only if—
(A) requested by the Secretary of the Treasury, or
(B) one or more participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries, of such plan
request in writing (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe by
regulation) that he exercise such authority on their behalf. In the case
of such a request under this paragraph he may exercise such authority
only if he determines that such violation affects, or such enforcement
is necessary to protect, claims of participants or beneficiaries to
benefits under the plan.
(2) The Secretary shall not initiate an action to enforce section 515 [29
USCS § 1145].
(c) Administrator's refusal to supply requested information; penalty for
failure to provide annual report in complete form. (1) Any administrator
(A) who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) or (4) of section
606 [29 USCS §1166(1) or (4)] with respect to a participant or
beneficiary, or (B) who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any
information which such administrator is required by this title to furnish
to a participant or beneficiary (unless such failure or refusal results from
matters reasonably beyond the control of the administrator) by mailing
the material requested to the last known address of the requesting
participant or beneficiary within 30 days after such request may in the
court's discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary
in the amount of up to SI00 a day from the date of such failure or
refusal, and the court may in its discretion order such other relief as it
deems proper.
(2) The Secretary may assess a civil penalty against any plan administrator of up to S 1,000 a day from the date of such plan administrator's
failure or refusal to file the annual report required to be filed with the
Secretary under section 101(b)(4) [29 USCS § 1021(b)(4)]. For purposes
of this paragraph, an annual report that has been rejected under section
104(a)(4) [29 USCS § 1024(a)(4)] for failure to provide material information shall not be treated as having been filed with the Secretary.
(3) Any employer maintaining a plan who fails to meet the notice
requirement of section 101(d) [29 USCS § 1021(d)] with respect to any
participant or beneficiary may in the court's discretion be liable to such
participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day from the
date of such failure, and the court may in its discretion order such other
relief as it deems proper.
(d) Status of employee benefit plan as entity. (1) An employee benefit plan
may sue or be sued under this title as an entity. Service of summons,
subpena, or other legal process of a court upon a trustee or an
administrator of an employee benefit plan in his capacity as such shall
constitute service upon the employee benefit plan. In a case where a plan
has not designated in the summary plan description of the plan an
individual as agent for the service of legal process, service upon the
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Secretary shall constitute such service. The Secretary, not later than 15
days after receipt of service under the preceding sentence, shall notify
the administrator or any trustee of the plan of receipt of such service.
(2) Any money judgment under this title against an employee benefit
plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not
be enforceable against any other person unless liability against such
person is established in his individual capacity under this title.
(e) Jurisdiction. (1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions under this title brought by the Secretary or
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. State courts of competent
jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent
jurisdiction of actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section.
(2) Where an action under this title is brought in a district court of the
United States, it may be brought in the distnct where the plan is
administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides
or may be found, and process may be served in any other distnct where
a defendant resides or may be found.
(f) Amount in controversy; citizenship of parties. The distnct courts of the
United States shall have junsdiction, without respect to the amount m
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief provided for
in subsection (a) of this section in any action.
(g) Attorney's fees and costs; awards in actions involving delinquent
contributions. (1) In any action under this title (other than an action
described in paragraph 2) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the
court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of
action to either party.
(2) In any action under this title by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a plan
to enforce section 515 [29 USCS § 1145] in which a judgment in favor of
the plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan—
(A) the unpaid contributions,
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,
(C) an amount equal to the greater of—
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or
(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount
not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as may be
permitted under Federal or State law) of the amount determined by
the court under subparagraph (A),
(D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to be paid by
the defendant, and
(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
For purposes of this paragraph, interest on unpaid contnbutions shall be
determined by using the rate provided under the plan, or, if none, the
rate prescribed under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
[26 USCS § 6621].
454

RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY

29 USCS § 1132

(h) Service upon Secretary of Labor and Secretary of the Treasury. A
copy of the complaint in any action under this title by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary (other than an action brought by one or more
participants or beneficiaries under subsection (a)(1)(B) which is solely for
the purpose of recovering benefits due such participants under the terms of
the plan) shall be served upon the Secretary and the Secretary of the
Treasury by certified mail. Either Secretary shall have the right in his
discretion to intervene in any action, except that the Secretary of the
Treasury may not intervene in any action under part 4 of this subtitle [29
USCS §§ 1101 et seq.]. If the Secretary brings an action under subsection
(a) on behalf of a participant or beneficiary, he shall notify the Secretary of
the Treasury.
(i) Administrative assessment of civil penalty. In the case of a transaction
prohibited by section 406 [29 USCS § 1106] by a party in interest with
respect to a plan to which this part applies, the Secretary may assess a civil
penalty against such party in interest. The amount of such penalty may not
exceed 5 percent of the amount involved in each such transaction (as
defined in section 4975(f)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26
USCS § 4975(f)(4)]) for each year or part thereof during which the
prohibited transaction continues, except that, if the transaction is not
corrected (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe in regulations
which shall be consistent with section 4975(f)(5) of such Code [26 USCS
§ 4975(f)(5)]) within 90 days after notice from the Secretary (or such
longer period as the Secretary may permit), such penalty may be in an
amount not more than 100 percent of the amount: involved. This subsection shall not applv to a transaction with respect to a plan described in
section 4975(e)(1) of such Code [26 USCS § 4975(e)(1)].
(j) Direction and control of litigation by Attorney General. In all civil
actions under this title, attorneys appointed by the Secretary may represent
the Secretary (except as provided in section 518(a) of title 28, United States
Code), but all such litigation shall be subject to the direction and control
of the Attorney General.
(k) Jurisdiction of actions against the Secretary of Labor. Suits by an
administrator, fiduciary, participant, or beneficiary of an employee benefit
plan to review a final order of the Secretary, to restrain the Secretary from
taking any action contrary to the provisions of this Act, or to compel him
to take action required under this title, may be brought in the district court
of the United States for the district where the plan has its principal office,
or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
(1) Civil penalties on violations by fiduciaries. (l)In the case of—
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of)
part 4 [29 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] by a fiduciary, or
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any
other person,
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the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other
person in an amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery
amount.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable recovery
amount" means any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or
other person with respect to a breach or violation described in paragraph (1)—
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to
a plan or its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding
instituted by the Secretary under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5).
(3) The Secretary may, in the Secretary's sole discretion, waive or reduce
the penalty under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines in writing
that—
(A) the fiduciary or other person acted reasonably and in good faith,
or
(B) it is reasonable to expect that the fiduciary or other person will
not be able tc restore all losses to the plan without severe financial
hardship unless such waiver or reduction is granted.
(4) The penalty imposed on a fiduciary or other person under this
subsection with respect to any transaction shall be reduced by the
amount of any penalty or tax imposed on such fiduciary or other person
with respect to such transaction under subsection (i) of this section and
section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 4975].
(Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, Title I, Subtitle B, Part 5, § 502, 88 Stat. 891;
Sept. 26, 1980, P. L. 96-364, Title III, § 306(b), 94 Stat. 1295; Apr. 7,
1986, P. L. 99-272, Title X, § 10002(b), 100 Stat. 231; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L.
100-203, Title IX, Subtitle D, Part II, Subpart D, §§ 9342(c), 9344, 101
Stat. 1330-372, 1330-373, Dec. 19, 1989, P. L. 101-239, Title II, Subtitle B,
§ 2101(a), (b), Title VII, Subtitle G, Pan V, Subpart C § 7881(b)(5)(B),
(j)(2), (3), Subpart D, §§ 7891(a)(1), 7894(f)(1), 103 Stat. 2123, 2438, 2442,
2445, 2450.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title I of Act Sept. 2, 1974,
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, popularly known as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which appears generally as 29
USCS §§ 1001 et seq. For full classification of this Title, consult USCS
Tables volumes.
"This part", referred to in this section, is Part 5 of Subtitle B of Title I
of Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat 891, popularly known as the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which appears
generally as 29 USCS §§ 1131 et seq. For full classification of this Part,
consult USCS Tables volumes.
"This Act", referred to in this section, is the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat.
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The Comptroller General shall not disclose the identity of any individual
or employer in making any information obtained under this subsection
available to the public.
(3) Definitions. For purposes of this subsection, the terms "employee
benefit plan", "participant", "administrator", "beneficiary", "plan sponsor", "employee", and "employer" are defined in section 3 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 USCS § 1002].
(Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11016(d)(l)-(3), 100 Stat. 275.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Explanatory notes:
This section was enacted as part of Act Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272,
Title XI, popularly known as the Single-Employer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1986, and not as part of Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L.
93-406, which is popularly known as the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, and which generally comprises this chapter.
Effective date of section:
Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11016(d)(4), 100 Stat. 275,
provided: "The preceding provisions of this subsection [adding this
section] shall be effective on the date of the enactment of this Act
[enacted Apr. 7, 1986].".
Other provisions:
Application of section. For provisions as to the application of this
section, see Act Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11019 in part,
which appears as 29 USCS § 1341 note.
§ 1144. Other laws
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 USCS § 1003(a)] and not exempt
under section 4(b) [29 USCS § 1003(b)]. This section shall take effect on
January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application. (1) This section shall not apply with
respect to any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which
occurred, before January 1, 1975.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29
USCS § 1003(a)], which is not exempt under section 4(b) [29 USCS
§ 1003(b)] (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the
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business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts,
banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the
Secretary of services or facilities of a State agency as permitted under
section 506 of this Act [29 USCS § 1136].
(4) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal
law of a State.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) shall not
apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw. Rev. Stat.
§§393-1 through 393-51).
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to exempt from
subsection (a)—
(i) any State tax law relating to employee benefit plans, or
(ii) any amendment of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act
enacted after September 2, 1974, to the extent it provides for more
than the effective administration of such Act as in effect on such
date.
(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), parts 1 and 4 of this subtitle
[29 USCS §§ 1021 et seq., 1101 et seq.], and the preceding sections of
this part [29 USCS §§ 1131 et seq.] to the extent they govern matters
which are governed by the provisions of such parts 1 and 4 [29 USCS
§§ 1021 et seq., 1101 et seq.], shall supersede the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act (as in effect on or after the date of the enactment of
this paragraph [enacted Jan. 14, 1983]), but the Secretary may enter
into cooperative arrangements under this paragraph and section 506
[29 USCS § 1136] with officials of the State of Hawaii to assist them
in effectuating the policies of provisions of such Act which are
superseded by such parts 1 and 4 [29 USCS §§ 1021 et seq., 1101 et
seq.] and the preceding sections of this part [29 USCS § 1131 et seq.].
(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section—
(i) in the case of an employee welfare benefit plan which is a
multiple employer welfare arrangement and is fully insured (or
which is a multiple employer welfare arrangement subject to an
exemption under- subparagraph (B)), any law of any State which
regulates insurance may apply to such arrangement to the extent
that such law provides—
(I) standards, requiring the maintenance of specified levels of
reserves and specified levels of contributions, which any such
plan, or any trust established under such a plan, must meet in
order to be considered under such law able to pay benefits in full
when due, and
(II) provisions to enforce such standards, and
(ii) in the case of any other employee welfare benefit plan which is
a multiple employer welfare arrangement, in addition to this title,
557

29 USCS § 1144

LABOR

any law of any State which regulates Insurance may apply to the
extent not inconsistent with the preceding sections of this title.
(B) The Secretary may, under regulations which may be prescribed by
the Secretary, exempt from subparagraph (A)(ii), individually or by
class, multiple employer welfare arrangements which are not fully
insured. Any such exemption may be granted with respect to any
arrangement or class of arrangements only if such arrangement or
each arrangement which is a member of such class meets the requirements of section 3(1) and section 4 [29 USCS §§ 1002(1), 1003]
necessary to be considered an employee welfare benefit plan to which
this title applies.
(C) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall affect the manner or extent to
which the provisions of this title apply to an employee welfare benefit
plan which is not a multiple employer welfare arrangement and which
is a plan, fund, or program participating in, subscribing to, or
otherwise using a multiple employer welfare arrangement to fund or
administer benefits to such plan's participants and beneficiaries.
(D) For purposes of this paragraph, a multiple employer welfare
arrangement shall be considered fully insured only if the terms of the
arrangement provide for benefits the amount of all of which the
Secretary determines are guaranteed under a contract, or policy of
insurance, issued by an insurance company, insurance service, or
insurance organization, qualified to conduct business in a State.
(7) Subsection (a) shall not apply to qualified domestic relations orders
(within the meaning of section 206(d)(3)(B)(i) [29 USCS
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)]).
(8) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any State law
mandating that an employee benefit plan not include any provision
which has the effect of limiting or excluding coverage or payment for
any health care for an individual who would otherwise be covered or
entitled to benefits or services under the terms of the employee benefit
plan, because that individual is provided, or is eligible for, benefits or
services pursuant to a plan under title XIX of the Social Security Act
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], to the extent such law is necessary for the
State to be eligible to receive reimbursement under title XIX of that Act
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.].
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations,
or other State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the
United States applicable only to the District of Columbia shall be
treated as a State law rather than a law of the United States.
(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof,
or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans
covered by this title.
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(d) Alteration, amendment, modification, invalidation, impairment, or supersedure of any law of the United States prohibited. Nothing in this title
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law of the United. States (except as provided in sections 111 and 507(b)
[29 USCS §§ 1031, 1137(b)]) or any rule or regulation issued under any
such law.
(Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, Title I, Subtitle B, Part 5, § 514, 88 Stat. 897;
Jan. 14, 1983, P.L. 97-473, Title III, §§ 301(a), 302(b), 96 Stat. 2611, 2613;
Aug. 23, 1984, P. L. 98-397, Title I, § 104(b), 98 Stat. 1436; Apr. 7, 1986,
P. L. 99-272, Title IX, Subtitle B, § 9503(d)(1), 100 Stat. 207; Dec. 19,
1989, P. L. 101-239, Title VII, Subtitle G, Part V, Subpart D,
§ 7894(f)(2)(A),(3)(A), 103 Stat. 2450, 2451.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title I of Act Sept. 2, 1974,
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, popularly known as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which appears generally as 29
USCS §§ 1001 et seq. For full classification of this Title, consult USCS
Tables volumes.
"Title IV", referred to in this section, is Title IV of Act Sept. 2, 1974,
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 1003, popularly known and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and appears generally as 29
USCS 1301 et seq. For full classification of such Title, consult USCS
Tables volumes.
Amendments:
1983. Act Jan. 14, 1983 (effective on the date of enactment on 1/14/83,
as provided by § 301(c) of such Act), in subsec. (b), added para. (5).
Such Act further (effective on the date of enactment on 1/14/83, as
provided by § 302(c) of such Act, which appears as 29 USCS § 1002
note), in subsec. (b), added para. (6).
1984. Act Aug. 23, 1984, in subsec. (b), added para. (7).
1986. Act Apr. 7, 1986 (effective as provided in § 9503(d)(2) of such
Act, which appears as a note to this section), in subsec. (b), added
para. (8).
1989. Act Dec. 19, 1989 (effective as provided by § 7894(f)(2)(B) of
such Act, which appears as a note to this section), in subsec. (b)(5)(C),
substituted "such parts 1 and 4 and the preceding sections of this part"
for "such parts".
Such Act further (effective as provided by § 7894(f)(3)(B) of such Act,
which appears as a note to this section) in subsec. (b)(6)(B), substituted
"section 3(1)" for "section 3(1)".
Other provisions:
Promulgation of regulations. For provisions authorizing the Secretary
to promulgate regulations, see 29 USCS § 1031.
Treatment of other State laws. Act Jan. 14, 1983, P.L. 97-473, Title
III, § 301(b), 96 Stat. 2611, effective on the date of enactment on Jan.
559
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ADDENDUM C

LAW OFFICES

WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW
SUITE 8 5 0
T W O FIFTY S E V E N T O W E R S
2 5 7 EAST EOO S O U T H - 2
S A L T

M.CHAEL J. W.LK.NS. P.C

^

K

JEFFREY R. OR.TT
LOR.N D. RONNOW. P.C.
KENDALL S. PETERSON
DEBBIE A. ROBB

E

C , T Y

'

U T A H

84111-2048

OF COUNSEL

TELEPHONE
<80,> 53^ 7575

*

°"

R O B E R T

HEA0MAN
S

"H

«

J R

O W C L U

FACSIMILE
(80II 531-7577

August 31, 1990

VIA FAX
375-3067
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq.
Ivie & Young
4 8 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Re:

Jackie Robertson and Craig Robertson v. Gem Insurance
Company
Civil No, CV 891505
Our File No. 740.037

Dear Jeff:
I have confirmed with Jeff Gabardi at Gem Insurance Company
the compromise we worked out on the telephone earlier today. He
will have ready on September 6, 1990, a check in the amount of
$13,764.22, made out to the Plaintiffs and you jointly (unless you
prefer it made out another way). The $13,764.22 is broken down as
follows:
1.

Medical Benefits

-

$8,092*46

2.

Prejudgment Interest
from April 1, 1989
to September 6, 1990

-

$1,160.01

3.

Attorneys1 Fees

-

$4,192.50

4.

Taxable Costs

-

$319.25

Total

$13,764.22

If any of the above is not your understanding, please call me.
If it is, you will be sending me an amended Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements. You also agreed to change your proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as follows:

P

'
-

C

Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq.
August 31, 1990
Page 2

1.

At page 3, Finding 11 will read as follows:
Gem; Insurance
Company
admits
receiving Dr. Adams' letter but
relied upon the hospital records and
continued to maintain that Mrs.
Robertson's
condition
was
preexisting.

2.
At page 5, Finding 19, and page 6, in the Judgment, you
will change the commencement date of the pre-judgment interest
from May 1, 1988 to April 1, 1989.
If you send these documents up to me, I will sign them and
send them back to you immediately.
Then, next week, once I
receive from you a signed Satisfaction of Judgment, I will mail to
you (or have available if you want to send someone up here to pick
it up) a check made out to you and your clients in the amount of
$13,764.22.
Very truly yours,
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW

/

/

i/f

Jeffrey R.^Oritt
JRO:;jb
S
cc: Jeffrey L. Gabardi, Esq.
PEAT1.LTR

"

LAW O F F I C E S

W1LKINS, O R I T T & R O N N O W
SUITE 8 5 0
TWO FIFTY S E V E N T O W E R S
2 5 7 EAST 2 0 0 SOUTH-2
S A L T

M.CHAEL J. W.LK.NS. P.C.

^

JEFFREY R. ORITT
LORIN D. RONNOW. P.C.
KENDALL S. PETERSON
DEBBIE A. ROBB

K

E

C , T Y

(

'

U T A H

84111^048

OF COUNSEL
A>

°' H E A D M ^ N " J R '
ROBERT S. HOWELL. P.C.

TELEPHONE
8 0 | , 531.7575

FACSIMILE
(SOU 531-7577

September 4, 1990

Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq.
Ivie & Young
4 8 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Re:

Jackie Robertson and Craicr Robertson v. Gem Insurance
Company
Civil No. CV 891505
Our File No. 740.037

Dear Jeff:
Enclosed please find the originals of your Amended Memorandum
of Costs and Disbursements, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment. I appreciate your making the changes we discussed
on the telephone last week.
I note that you need to have your
secretary sign and notarize the bottom of page 2 of your Amended
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements before you file it.
I will get the check from Gem on Thursday and mail it down to
you.
I would appreciate your sending me the Satisfaction of
Judgment, signed by your clients, by return mail.
Very truly yours,
WILKINS, ORITT &\RONNOW

Jeffrey R./ Oritt
'

JR0:jb
cc: Jeffrey L. Gabardi, Esq.
PEATROSS.LTR

/

/

•

/ / (/

LAW O F F I C E S

WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW
SUITE 8 5 0
TWO FIFTY S E V E N T O W E R S
2 5 7 EAST 2 0 0 S O U T H - 2
MICHAEL J. WILKINS. P.C.
JEFFREY R. ORITT
LORIN 0. RONNOW. P.C.
KENDALL S. PETERSON
DEBBIE A. ROBB

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 I I I - 2 0 A 8
TELEPHONE
(80IJ 531-7575

OF COUNSEL
A. O. HEADMAN. JR.
ROBERT S. HOWELL. P.C.

FACSIMILE
I80II 531-7577

September 6, 1990

Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq.
Ivie & Young
4 8 North University Avenue
P. O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84 603
Re:

Jackie Robertson and Craig Robertson v. Gem Insurance
Company
Civil No. CV 891505
Our File No. 740.037

Dear Jeff:
Enclosed please find a check from Gem Insurance Company made
out to your firm and your clients in the amount of $13,764.22, in
full payment of the Judgment that has been, or will be, entered
against Gem in the above-referenced matter. You are authorized to
tender this check to your clients as soon as they sign a
Satisfaction of Judgment in your office. I would appreciate your
sending me a copy of the executed Satisfaction of Judgment and
filing the same with the Court. If you would rather that I file
it, please send me the original.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
WILKINS, ORITT/-A RONNOW

JRO:jb
Enclosure
cc: Jeffrey L, Gabardi, Esq.
PEATROSS.LTR
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GEM INSURANCE COMPANY

TH SOUTH 4TH EAST OFFICE

P.O. BOX 449
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-0449

SALT LAKE CHY. UTAH 84111

31-

31-73
1240'

No. 02723

KEY BANK OF UTAH
DATE_

THE SUM 13764 Dollars and 22 Cents

PAY

:_JE^=1E

09-04-90

DOLLARS $

1 J / / b 4

'^

TO T H E
O R D E R OF~

r
•JACKIE & CRAIG ROBERTSON AND
I V I E & YOUNG

r

u^^

L
.ii'QO 2 7 E3»' «: i 21*000 7 3 ?•:

5&000&
g l l •-• •_'JJGfafarBg

REMITTANCE STATEMENT
DATE

09-04-90

NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

CLAIMS LITIGATION JUDGEM

ACCT. NO.

6120.03

GROSS
AMOUNT

13764.22

DEDUCTIONS

0.00

NET
AMOUNT

13764.22

DETACH BEFORE DEPOSITING
GEM I N S U R A N C E COMPANY

ADDENDUM D
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July 17, 1989

Mountain States Ste§'l
325 South Highway 114
Lendon, UT 84042
REGARDING:,
TERMINATION DATE:

POLICY CS5626
JULY 1, 1989

Dear Employer:
We received your notice to terminate the majority of your
employees from your group insurance policy with our company. It
appears by your notice that your participation has dropped below the
required level of 60%. We have cancelled your group insurance
policy effective July 1, 1989, due to the lack of required
participation.
If this is not the case, we would be happy to review payroll
information for the last three months and your current Employers
Quarterly Wage List for possible reinstatement o the policy. This
information must be received in our office by no later than July 31,
1989r for review. Upon receipt of this information, we will advise
if reinstatement is possible. If we do not receive the information
by the date indicated, we will be unable to consider reinstatement
of your existing policy at a later date. I have enclosed copies of
your signed Trust Agreement and the Master Policy pertaining to
participation for your review.
If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,

CprtG i y w/7L v i e
Manager Administrative Services
CI/11
cc: Gerald Nuelle, Agent
Certified Mail: P 657 455 217

CORPORATE OFFICE
P.O. Box 449 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-044$
Local (801) 521 -7164 / Utah (800) 521-7164 / Customer Service (801) 521 -0099
All States Outside of Utah
P.O. Box 3592 / Salt Lake Citv. Utah 841 lO-TSQr

ADDENDUM E

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED
ANDREA PECXHAM, as the mother
and natural guardian of
KYLE M- PECXHAM, an infant;
and ANDREA PECXHAM, individually,

ROIC*T a. tXNma
CL£R*. VI. S . 0I3TKICT <~

BY.

DCFUtT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

NO.

CIV-33-1513-T

GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH, a
corporation,
Defendant.

ORDER
Plaintiffs instituted this action against Gem State Mutual of
Utah, now known as Gem Insurance Campany ("Gem") , alleging claims
for breach of contract; breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing; emotional distress and punitive damages.
has

The defendant

filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the

plaintiffs1 causes of action for breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing; emotional distress and punitive damages are preempted
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
U- S. C* §§ 1001 et seq.

("ERISA"), 29

The defendant also contends that the

plaintiffs are required to arbitrate the dispute and that the
plaintiffs' remaining medical expense claims are not covered under
the insurance policy issued by Gem.
The court concludes that the plaintiffs' state common law tort
and contract claims are precluded by ERISA, but additional briefs

are

reqirirga-n^oiir^cflG'"" par-^w^-^i tr-n-i rr-r-t ^^.— r i ^^,^^. Y . m -h««u.,„ *, - — - - -

arbitration issue.

„-.v^

Although it is unnecessary for the court to

recite the complete facts as stated in both the plaintiffs' and
defendant's briefs, the facts pertinent to the court's decision
follow:1
Gem created the Inter-Mountain Employers Trust ("IMET") to
enable subscribers to the IMET to participate in group policies of
insurance, which would be sold by Gem*

Neither the original

Declaration of Trust for IMET nor any of the amendments to the
trust document state that the insurance policies that Gem was to
issue would be governed by ERISA,2

All decisions regarding the

insurance policies, including the approval or denial of insurance
applications and the handling and resolution of claims are made by
Gem.

The various groups who subscribe to the IMET have no

connecting relationship such as a common business, industry, or
trade.
AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc. (lfAAA!f) , subscribed to the
IMET and obtained a comprehensive major medical insurance policy
from Gem effective August 1, 1986 for any of its employees who
wanted coverage. Coverage was not mandatory under the policy. The
corporate policy received by AAA does not indicate that it would
be

subject

to

ERISA

and

contains

none

of

the

disclosure

'Although the plaintiffs purport to dispute many of the defendant's factual statements, tie critical
facts are uncontested.
References to tie applicability of state law found within the master policy issued to AAA and the
arbitration amendment do not, the court concludes, conclusively establish that the program is not governed
by ERISA. See generally Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 R2d 1367 (11th Or. 1982).
2

notes that AAA also has established a profit sharing plan for its
employees, which is in accordance with ERISA.
Andrea Peckham, one of the plaintiffs in this action and the
mother of plaintiff Kyle Peckham, was an employee of AAA when its
group insurance coverage underwritten by Gem became effective. At
that time AAA was sent identification cards and benefit description
booklets from Gem for distribution to all of its covered employees.
AAA paid the premiums for single coverage for each of its employees
who desired group health and life insurance coverage, including
Mrs. Peckham, who was enrolled under a single coverage plan.

The

bookkeeper/office manager at AAA's principal office in Salt Lake
City, Utah was AAA's liaison with Gem. Generally paper work of any
kind concerning any employee's group health insurance benefits was
routed through Mrs. Wilson for forwarding to Gem.
The initial inquiry is whether or not the group policy issued
by Gem is an "employee welfare benefit plan" and, thus, governed
by ERISA. "Congress enacted ERISA to protect working men and women
from

abuses

retirement

in the administration
plans

and

employee

and investment of private

welfare

plans."

Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982).

Donovan

v.

With a few

inapplicable exceptions, ERISA applies to any employee benefit plan
if it is established or maintained by any employer or employee
organization engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity

3

Sec VLX supra.
3

affecting

commerce, or

Syr tropin dii • em^^oygp»^«^iil..an . ^m^w^u

organization. 29 U. S. C. § 1003(a).

An employee benefit plan is

defined in 29 U. S. C. § 1002:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan11
and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by
an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose
of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through
the purchase
of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical,
or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in
the event of sicJcness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment . . .
Consequently, under ERISA an employee welfare benefit plan or
welfare plan is:
(1) a ,fplan, fund, or program'1 (2) established
or maintained (3) by an employer or by an
employee organization, or by both (4) for the
purpose of providing medical, surgical,
hospital care, sickness, accident, disability,
death ... benefits ... (5) to participants or
their beneficiaries.
Donovan v. Dillingham, 638 F.2d at 1371. The existence of an ERISA
plan is a question of fact, to be answered in light of all of the
surrounding circumstances and facts from the point of view of a
reasonable person-,

Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. ,

859 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1988) .

In determining whether a plan has

been established, a court must determine whether a reasonable
person could ascertain the intended benefits, beneficiaries, source
of financing and procedures for receiving benefits.

Donovan v.

Dillingham. 638 P.2d at 1373.
It is obvious that IMET is not an ERISA plan, because the
4

Managers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617
(9th Cir. 1987) . However, this does not preclude a determination
that an employer, such as AAA, who subscribed to IMET, established
and maintained its own individual ERISA plan.

The Department of

Labor has explicitly left open this possibility, in situations when
it has denied ERISA plan status to trusts such as IMET, in which
unrelated employers participate.

E.g., Dep't of Labor Ops. 86-08

A (Feb. 3, 1986); 30-40 A (July 9, 1980); 79-41 A (June 29, 1979)\
As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Credit Managers Ass'n, an
employer can easily establish an ERISA plan, by doing no more than
arranging for a group-type insurance program, unless it is a mere
advertiser who makes no contributions on behalf of its employees.
ERISA does not require a formal, written plan.

Donovan v.

Dillingham, 633 F.2d at 1372.

The purchase of a group insurance

policy

employees

covering

a

class

of

does

not

conclusively

establish a welfare plan, but it is substantial evidence that a
plan has been created. Id.
According to Department of Labor regulations, 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-l(j), the term employee welfare benefit plan does not
include a group insurance program if employee participation is
completely voluntary; the employer does not contribute premiums to
the insurer or make a profit from the program; and the sole
functions of the employer are, without endorsing the program, to

'Available on WESTLAW FLB-ERISA database
S

premiums through payroll deductions, and to remit the premiums to
the

insurer.

In this case, however, AAA contributed to the

program by paying the insurance premiums for single coverage for
all of its employees,

AAA had provided group health insurance

benefits to its employees

for several years and the corporate

policy handbook provided that free group medical and life insurance
benefits would be provided to all employees.

In addition, AAA

performed certain administrative functions in connection with the
plan, including maintaining a file containing all insurance forms
and benefit description booklets.
Having considered the factors set forth in Dillingham, 638
F.2d at 1370-73 and the Department of Labor's opinion letters

and

regulations, which are entitled to considerable weight, Otto v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins, Co,, 814 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1986), the
court finds that the insurance program established by AAA is an
employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA.

This

conclusion accords with the weight of recent federal decisions.
E.g., Brundacre-Peterson v. Compears Health Services,
(7th Cir. 1989) ;

F.2d

Roe v. General American Life Ins. Co., 712 F.2d

450 (10th Cir. 1983) ; Dodd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
633 F. Supp. 564 (E. D. Cal. 1988) ; Davis v. Time Ins. Co. , 698 F.
Supp. 1317 (S. D. Miss. 1983) ; Benvenuto v. Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co.. 643 F. Supp. 87 (D. N. J. 1986); Bichsel v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. . No. Civ-37-885-T (W.D. Okl. Aug. 15, 1988).

See

Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d at 97-99;

6

F.2d at 625.
The cases relied upon by the plaintiffs are not persuasive in
light of Donovan v. Dillincrhan, 633 F.2d at 13 67, and its progeny.
Significantly, the plaintiffs do not even discuss or attempt to
distinguish the decisions cited by the defendant,

which support

the conclusion that AAA established its own single-employer welfare
benefit plan.
The plaintiffs do not dispute the effect that a determination
that they were beneficiaries of an "employment welfare benefit
plan"

would have on their breach of duty of good faith and fair

dealing, emotional distress and punitive damages claims.

It is

clear that under Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 431 U. S. 41
(1987), the plaintiffs' state common law tort and contract claims
are preempted.
With respect to the plaintiffs1 remaining claim for medical
expenses,

the court must determine whether or not the dispute

between Gem and the plaintiffs should be resolved by arbitration•
The

plaintiffs have

cited

Article

23, § 8 of the Oklahoma

Constitution and 15 Okl. Stat. § 802(A) as barring the enforcement
of the arbitration amendment, upon which Gem relies.

Gem has

responded that Utah, rather than Oklahoma law is applicable. The
plaintiffs are directed to respond to the defendant's argument
regarding the applicable law and the defendant is directed to
discuss: (1) whether the Oklahoma Constitution bars enforcement of
the arbitration clause and

(2) whether, assuming Utah law is
7

applied,

"CXIJLS

u.wu.-^ w

UA«-*.J

w.*.w*.— —

c

unconstitutional under the law of.the state in which the court
'. r

sits.

The p a r t i e s a r e d i r e c t e d to' f i l e t h e i r supplemental b r i e f s

w i t h i n t e n (10) days hereof,
IT IS SO ORDERED t h i s

^^/O/^

day of August, 1989.

UNITED STATES QISTRICT(TUDGE
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ADDENDUM F

GEM INSURANCE COMPANY
J

V

^^

December 5, 1988
Mountain States Steel
P.O. Box M
Provo, UT 84603-0220
Regarding:

J

Group Number:

CS5626

Effective Date:

November 1, 1988

J

Dear Employer:
Your application has been approved under the IMET Trust.
Enclosed are administration materials including: Claim Forms,
Enrollment and Waiver Forms, Change Forms, Employee Identification
Cards and Booklets describing your coverage under your Flex-Med
plan. We have also enclosed an Administrative Instruction page
which explains the method of adding and terminating employees from
your group insurance program.
Please distribute one booklet to each of your employees and ask them
to read each section carefully. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SCHEDULE
OF BENEFITS, GENERAL EXCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS AND PRE-EXISTING
CONDITIONS BE READ BY EACH OF YOUR EMPLOYEES AND THEIR SPOUSES.
Each new employee will receive an I.D. Card and Booklet at the time
they enroll.
If you or your employees have questions, please call our office at
521-0099 or (Utah wats: 1-800-521-7164).
We appreciate your election to insure your employees with Gem
Insurance under the IMET Trust and we look forward to providing you
with claims administration service which will be satisfactory to you
and your employees.
Thank you,
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY
Issue Department
cc:

Gerald Nuelle, Agent

J
CORPORATE OFFICE
P.O. Box 449 / Salt Lake City, Utah 841 10-0449
Local (801) 521 -7 164 / Utah (800) 521 -7164 / Customer Service (801) 521 -0099

